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THE INFLUENCE OF RACE IN SCHOOL
FINANCE REFORM
James E. Ryan*
It would be an exaggeration to say that school finance reform is all
about race, but largely in the same way that it is an exaggeration to say
that welfare reform is all about race. Like welfare reform, the contro
versy generated by school finance litigation and reform has, on the
surface, little to do with race. Battles over school funding, which have
been waged in nearly forty state supreme courts and at least as many
state legislatures, instead appear to be over such issues as the redistri
bution of resources, retaining local control over education, and the ef
ficacy of increased expenditures.1 But just as race seems to be an in
fluential undercurrent in welfare policy and debate, so too does it
appear to influence school finance litigation and reform. Whereas the
role of race in welfare reform has been well canvassed,2 the influence
of race in school finance litigation and reform is virtually unexamined.
Indeed, the only direct evidence bearing on the topic consists of
two studies of popular attitudes toward school finance reform, one
conducted by Professor Douglas Reed in New Jersey and the other by
Professor Kent Tedin in Texas.3 Both New Jersey and Texas have
witnessed long court battles over school finance.4 The Reed and
Tedin studies indicated that white citizens in both states inaccurately

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1988, Yale;
J.D.1992, University of Virginia.-Ed. Many thanks to Michael Heise, John C. Jeffries, Jr.,
Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson, and Elizabeth Magill for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts. Toby Heytens, Mary Kane, and Sue Messenger provided terrific research assistance;
a special thanks to Darcy Goddard for her indefatigable research and editorial assistance.

1. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Willi am A.
Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?, 42 NAT'L TAX J.465 (1989) [hereinafter Fischel,
Did Serrano]; William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 6fr/
(1996) [hereinafter Fischel, How Serrano]; Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Re·
fonn" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 423 (1991).
2 See, e.g., EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE 100-11 (1991);
MICHAEL K. BROWN, RA.CE, MONEY, AND TIIE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 1-29 (1999);
JAMES T.PATTERSON, AMERICA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY 1900-1994, at 134, 211-23
(3d ed. 1994).
3. See Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation
and the Impact ofthe New Judicial Federalism, 32 L. & Soc'Y REV. 175, 209 (1998); Kent L.
Tedin, Self-Interest, Symbolic Values, and the Financial Equalization of the Public Schools,
56 J.POL. 628 (1994).
4. See infra Section ill. A (discussing school finance litigation in New Jersey and Texas).
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perceived school finance reform as primarily benefiting blacks.5
Reed's study also indicated that nonwhites tended to support school
finance reform more than whites,6 and Tedin's study revealed that the
level of support among whites depended as much upon racial attitudes
as it did upon self-interest - e.g., some whites whose school districts
stood to gain from school finance reform opposed such reform for rea
sons apparently having to do with their attitudes toward blacks.7
The Reed study, which involved surveying 800 New Jersey resi
dents, and the Tedin study, which involved surveying 1,000 Texas resi
dents, are obviously fairly limited and do not "prove" much of any
thing. Nonetheless, the studies raise and offer some support for the
hypothesis that race plays a significant role in school finance reform. I
believe that hypothesis is true, that it is not well understood, and that
it carries enormously important implications for school finance reform
in particular and education reform in general. Indeed, if I am correct
and race does play an influential role in school finance reform, school
finance scholars and practitioners should begin paying closer attention
than they have to the dynamics of race relations and school desegrega
tion; historians and legal scholars should recognize with added· confi
dence the wisdom of the NAACP's desegregation strategy; and civil
rights attorneys, courts, critical race theorists, and conservative critics
of desegregation should hesitate before abandoning the goal of deseg
regation.
I intend to explore the influence of race in school finance reform
not by following the methodologies of Tedin and Reed and searching
for further evidence of popular attitudes, but by surveying the history
and success of minority districts in school finance litigation. Specifi
cally, this Article examines how predominantly minority districts have
fared when they have been involved in school finance litigation and
how legislatures have responded to successful school finance chal
lenges. Based on my review of the pertinent data, it appears that mi
nority school districts - particularly urban minority districts - do not
fare as well as white districts in school finance litigation. More pre
cisely, minority districts do not win school finance cases nearly as of
ten as white districts do, and in the few states where minority districts
have successfully challenged school finance schemes, they have en
countered legislative recalcitrance that exceeds, in both intensity and
duration, the legislative resistance that successful white districts have
faced.8 As this and additional evidence suggests, there are strong rea
sons to believe that the racial composition of the school district plays

S.

See Reed, supra note 3, at 211-12; Tedin, supra note 3, at 634 n.18, 639 n.27.

6. See Reed, supra note 3, at 212.
7.

See Tedin, supra note 3, at 638, 646-47.

8. See discussion infra Parts II & ill.
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an influential role in determining its success or failure in school fi
nance litigation and legislative reform.
As already suggested, this evidence is significant for academic, his
torical, and practical reasons. First, the evidence offers further proof
that one must understand the dynamics of race relations and school
desegregation in order to understand fully the limits and dynamics of
school finance reform.9 Second, the evidence presented here suggests
that the principle underlying the NAACP's desegregation strategy namely, that green follows white - appears to have been a sound one,
as the somewhat precarious financial situations facing predominantly
minority districts stand in contrast to the relatively sound funding re
ceived by integrated districts. Lastly, the evidence is relevant to the
current debate about returning to de facto segregated neighborhood
schools and/or consciously creating single-race schools for minorities.
There is waning support these days for continuing efforts to integrate
schools, while there is growing support for educational reforms di
rected at improving the education provided within racially isolated
schools.10 What has been missing from this debate is consideration of
the financial consequences of returning to de facto segregated schools
or pursuing single-race schools; this Article suggests that the conse
quences could be significant and deserve to be part of the contempo
rary debate about school desegregation.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I examines the current
expenditure levels of minority districts in order to ascertain whether
these districts are underfunded relative to other districts within their
respective states. It turns out that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
most minority districts are not relatively underfunded, but they are
likely to become so when they lose funds that have been directed to
them through court-ordered desegregation decrees. For those minor
ity districts already funded below average, as well as for those that will
soon fall into that category, school finance reform is of obvious impor
tance. Parts II and III accordingly assess the performance of minority
districts in school finance litigation and reform. In Part II, I examine
how predominantly minority districts have fared when they have been
involved in school finance litigation, and in Part III, I examine legisla
tive responses to court decisions. Based on this examination, I con
clude that race does appear to play an influential role in school finance
litigation and legislative reform, and in Part IV, I discuss in some de
tail the academic, historical, and practical implications of this conclu
sion.

9. I develop this thesis in greater detail in a separate article. See James E. Ryan,
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 272-96 (1999).
10. See id. at 253-54.
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A brief caveat is in order before proceeding. It seems clear from
the evidence examined that minority districts - particularly urban
minority districts - do not fare well in school finance litigation, and it
seems reasonable to conclude that race is playing an influential role in
determining outcomes. I would be the first to acknowledge, however,
the limitations of my approach: there are a number of factors not re
lated to race that cause plaintiffs to lose in court and that cause legisla
tors to respond quickly or slowly to court orders, and I cannot pretend
to have controlled for those numerous factors. The brush I am using is
too broad. This Article thus represents a first look at the evidence and
an invitation to those with the appropriate analytical skills to take a
closer inspection of the data. In the meantime, however, the patterns
noted below should enter the conversation about the future of school
finance reform, the dismantling of desegregation decrees, and the fi
nancial implications of returning to or promoting majority-minority
schools.
I.

MYTHS AND REALITIES REGARDING RACE AND
SCHOOL FUNDING

Most black students - roughly two-thirds - attend elementary
and secondary school in central city districts. Most central city dis
tricts, in turn, are populated primarily by minority students - gener
ally African-American and Hispanic. These students are also dispro
portionately poor, and they generally perform below average on
standardized tests.11 Poor students have greater educational needs and
require more resources to educate than do affluent students.12 Schools
dominated by poor students will therefore usually be more expensive
to operate than schools populated by middle- and upper-income stu
dents. In addition, because of generally higher costs in urban areas, as
opposed to rural or suburban areas, inner city schools are typically
more expensive to operate.13 The greater needs of poor children, cou
pled with the greater costs of operating urban schools, virtually guar
antee that urban schools will have to spend more than average simply
to provide average educational opportunities.
Although there is general agreement regarding the higher costs of
educating poor children, particularly poor children in urban districts,

11.

See id. at 272-75 (discussing data regarding urban schools).

12. See, e.g., JEAN ANYON, GHETIO SCHOOLING 6-7 (1997); WAYNE RIDDLE & LIANE
WHITE, PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENDITURE DISPARITIES, CONG. REs. SERV. REP. No. 96-51
EPW, at 4, 24 (1995). Indeed, that poor students require additional resources is the premise
of Title I, a federal program ostensibly designed to provide financial assistance to schools
educating impoverished students. See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1994).
13. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ISSUE BRIEF IB-2-96, at 4
see also Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 434 (N.J. 1997) ("Abbott IV"). -

(Dec. 1996);
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there is much discord concerning the relationship between expendi
tures and achievement. An intense debate is raging within the educa
tion policy world regarding the extent to which we can expect re
sources to improve the academic achievement of urban minority
students.14 For purposes of this Article, I would like to put this debate
to one side and assume that resources will help these students. The
question that I would like to address instead is the likelihood that stu
dents in predominantly minority districts will receive resources suffi
cient to provide an adequate education.15 A natural starting point for
this inquiry is an examination of current expenditure levels in pre
dominantly minority districts.
It is easy to imagine, perhaps too easy, that predominantly minor
ity schools are also the most poorly funded. This is the impression left
by Jonathan Kozol's Savage Inequalities, a well-known and searing but largely anecdotal - account of high poverty, urban minority
schools.16 And the "fact" of underfunded minority schools is casually
reported by commentators, often without citation or serious study.17
The reality, however, is more complicated. In fact, it is generally not
true that predominantly minority districts are "underfunded," if one
defines that term in relation to the statewide average.
At the same time, many of the minority districts that are spending
over the statewide average are doing so as a result of desegregation
funds, typically Milliken II funds for compensatory and remedial pro-

14. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 291-92 (discussing the debate regarding the extent to
which spending and achievement are related-i.e., the extent to which "money matters").
15. By "resources sufficient to provide an adequate education," I do not mean anything
more precise than the level of resources one could reasonably expect, if spent well, to cover
the costs of providing an education that would prepare most students to enter the work force
or go on to higher education. One of the problems that plagues school finance reform, and
by extension this Article, is that no one really knows the exact level of resources necessary to
provide an adequate education. The best one can do is to compare spending and results: if a
particular school spends X amount of money per pupil and is achieving good results (e.g.,
most students perform adequately or better on standardized tests, go on to college, or find
gainful employment after high school}, that spending level can be used as a benchmark for
schools populated by a similar group of students. As a rough benchmark, I use statewide
average expenditures. Although it is reasonable to expect that urban schools will need to
spend more than average in order to produce average results, the statewide average is a de
cent starting point for assessing the financial circumstances of minority districts.
16. See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES:
SCHOOLS 112-13 (1991).

CHil.DREN IN MIBRICA'S

17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure
to Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1002 (1994) (citing
Roberta L. Steel, Note, All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate Schools, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 591, 620 (1993}}; see also id. at 1002 & nn.14-16 (citing figures from a
student law review note and Kozol's Savage Inequalities as demonstrating that "the reality is
that far more is spent on the average white student's education than on the average black
student's"); Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
395, 399 (1991).
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grams.18 A comparison of predominantly minority districts spending
over the statewide average with those spending below that average
bears out this hypothesis, although there are some exceptions. When
desegregation funding is terminated, as is occurring in states across the
country, expenditure levels for predominantly minority districts will
certainly fall. 19 Thus, while the perception that minority schools are
underfunded may not be accurate now, it may be closer to reality in
the near future.
·

A.

Data and Methodology

Before describing the data regarding the racial composition of
school districts and their expenditure levels, it is necessary to describe
and justify the measure used here as a benchmark. Because of the
varied ways in which equity in school funding can be measured, ineq
uitable school funding is often in the eye of the beholder. The most
common baseline for measurement is horizontal, intrastate equity,
which simply examines how expenditures per pupil vary among dis
tricts within the same state. Although a useful starting point, the
shortcomings of this measurement are obvious. Left out of considera
tion are the differences in student needs and in the costs of providing
similar services, two factors that can substantially affect the purchasing
power of an education dollar. That a rural district and an urban dis
trict have the same funding per pupil may not be equitable, for exam
ple, if it costs more to provide the same services in urban areas and/or
if the urban district has students with more expensive needs.20
18. In Milliken II, the Court held that compensatory and remedial programs can be in
cluded as part of a court-ordered desegregation decree, and that states can be ordered to
contribute to the funding of such programs. See Millike n v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
19. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the termination of desegre
gation funding).

20. Just as focusing on horizontal equity has some shortcomings, so too does focusing
solely on intrastate disparities and ignoring interstate disparities. Interstate disparities can
be dramatic. In the 1994-95 school year, for example, average per-pupil spending varied
from a low of $3,431 in Utah to a high of $9,136 in New Jersey. See RIDDLE & WIDTE, supra
note 12, at 19. (In a classroom of 25 students, this $5,700 disparity amounts to $142,500 per
class.) The disparities between the poorest districts of one state and the wealthiest of an
other are of an even higher magnitude, approaching and sometimes exceeding $10,000 per
pupil.
See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 1020 CONG., REPORT ON
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN: THE IMPACT OF FISCAL INEQUITY ON THE EDUCATION OF
STUDENTS AT RISK 19-20 (Comm. Print 1991) (prepared by William L. Taylor & Dianne M.
Piche) [hereinafter SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN] (reporting that the lowest spending dis
trict in Mississippi spent $1,324 per pupil in 1986-87, while in the same year two of the high
est spending districts in New York spent $11,752 and $10,544 per pupil).
I will not focus on interstate disparities primarily for practical reasons: school finance
reform has traditionally been a state-by-state effort, and there appears little current prospect
for increased federal involvement in encouraging or requiring interstate equality. The clos
est thing to federal involvement is a provision in the 1994 Improving America's Schools Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-802, ("!ASA") that authorizes a funding incentive to encourage states to
equalize their own school finance schemes. Although this provision could potentially help
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I rely for discussion and analysis primarily on expenditure figures
for seventy-four urban districts, contained in a recent special edition of
Education Week, which focused on the status of urban schools.21
These seventy-four districts are a representative sample of urban dis
tricts across the country and thus include at least one urban district
from each state, with the exception of the handful of states (such as
Montana and Maine) that are ovenvhelmingly rural. The expenditure
figures reported in the compilation are weighted to account for differ
ences in cost of living and in the educational needs of the students in
the district.22 This weighting of expenditures provides a more accurate
picture of the actual purchasing power of an educational dollar and
thus allows for a more realistic comparison of districts.
I compare these weighted per-pupil expenditures against the state
average expenditure, in an effort to assess whether one can fairly con
clude that urban minority districts are underfunded. To be sure, this is
not the only possible basis of comparison.
One could compare
spending in urban districts to that in surrounding suburbs, a compari
son that typically reveals fairly large disparities in favor of the subur
ban districts and one that forms the basis of a number of school fi
Although these urban-suburban disparities are
nance cases.23
discussed, using statewide averages as the benchmark for comparison
seems the best way to control for some differences in expenditures
that are not likely linked to race. If affluent suburban districts, as is
usually the case, are spending well above both urban minority districts
and the state average, they are also spending at levels above those of
other white suburban and rural districts that are less affluent. By con
trast, if the average school district in the state is spending above urban
eradicate interstate disparities, the unlikelihood that the federal government will play a large
role in addressing those disparities is perhaps best revealed by the fact that the provision in
the !ASA has not been funded. See LIANE WHITE, EDUCATION FINANCE INCENTIVE
GRANT UNDER ESEA TITLE I, CONG. REs. SERV. REP. No. 95-963 EPW (1995). It is none
theless instructive to keep the interstate disparities in mind, if only to provide some perspec
tive on the scope and magnitude of intrastate disparities.
21.

See Quality Counts, EDUC. WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 56.

22. More and more researchers in the field are making such adjustments to expenditure
levels in an effort to capture the actual "buying power" of educational funds within different
kinds of districts. Although it has long been recognized that cost and need adjustments
should be made in assessing equity in school financing, see, e.g., ROBERT BERNE & LEANNA
STIEFEL, THE MEASUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE (1984), the approach used
to weigh expenditures is still being refined.
See, e.g., NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, supra note 13, at 3 (" 'Buying power' is a new concept currently under devel
opment by the education research community. Actual dollars are expressed to reflect differ
ences in the relative costs of providing educational services," including differences in costs of
living and differences in the educational needs of students.). The basic approach is to count
students with special needs and students living in urban districts as a fraction above one stu
dent. See id.

23. See, e.g., George C. Galster, Polarization, Place, and Race, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1421,
1441 (1993) (noting that, as "[c]ompared to suburban districts, the forty-seven largest urban
districts spend $873 less per pupil").
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minority districts, then it seems more likely that race is a plausible ex
planation of the disparity.
B.

Myths

The central myth that must be addressed (though not completely
debunked) is that predominantly minority districts are generally un
derfunded as compared to predominantly or exclusively white dis
tricts.24 This common misperception likely stems from the historical
reality that, prior to and for a period after Brown, minority schools
typically received fewer state funds than white schools.25 But this no
longer appears to be true. Instead, there is a great deal of variation
both across and within states. Some urban, heavily minority districts
spend well above the state average, whereas others - sometimes
within the same state - spend below the state average. On balance, it
appears that minority districts are more likely than not to spend above
the state average, even after adjusting for the higher costs of providing
educational services in urban areas.
Specifically, among the seventy-four urban districts examined,
forty-five spent above the statewide average in 1993-94, the school
year for which the figures were compiled. Of these forty-five districts,
nine were majority white, and thirty-six were majority non-white.
Twenty-eight of the urban districts spent below the statewide average.
Of these twenty-eight, five were majority white, and twenty-three
were majority non-white. Focusing solely on the minority districts re
veals that thirty-six of fifty-nine predominantly minority districts (or
61 % ) in this sample spent above statewide averages.26
Some of these thirty-six districts, moreover, spent well above the
statewide average: Little Rock, Phoenix, Atlanta, Kansas City (MO),
Pittsburgh, and Richmond all spent more than $1,000 per pupil above
the state average. Conversely, some of the minority districts spending
below the state average were quite near the average, with six (Sacra
mento, San Jose, Kansas City (KS), Clark County (NV), Fort Worth,
and Norfolk) spending only $100 or less per pupil below the statewide
average.27 Given that the figures have been adjusted to account for
the higher costs of providing educational services in urban areas, it is

24. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Race, Education, and the Construction of a Disabled
Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1321 (1995) (asserting, without citation, that "predominantly
African-American or minority school districts often receive significantly fewer financial re
sources").
25. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 88, 122, 134 (1975);
John J. Donohue Ill et al., Social Action, Private Choice and Philanthropy, at 3-4 (Dec.
1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. For the figures in this paragraph, see Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 25-75.
27. See id. at 56-57, 62-63, 66-67.
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safe to assume that actual expenditure levels in at least these six dis
tricts - and probably others - exceeded statewide averages.
Funding levels also do not appear to correlate in a linear way with
the percentage of minority students in districts. It is not consistently
true, in other words, that the greater the percentage of minority stu
dents, the less the funding levels.28 In Virginia, for example, Rich
mond spends $1100 per pupil above the state average and is 92% mi
nority. Norfolk, which is only 67% minority, spends $300 below the
statewide average. In Florida, the school district of which Miami is a
part is 85% minority and spends $350 above the statewide average, as
compared to the Broward County School District, which is 49% mi
nority and spends only $16 above the statewide average. There are
counterexamples, to be sure. Compton, California, is 100% minority,
for example, and spends $250 below the statewide average, while San
Diego is only 69% minority and spends $450 above the statewide av
erage.29 But the fact that there is variation is enough to prove the
point that funding levels, at least at the moment, do not consistently
drop as the percentage of minority students rises.
This is not to deny that there is evidence that funding disparities
within some states closely track the racial composition of districts. To
understand the full picture, which unfortunately most closely resem
bles a Picasso, it is worth considering that as of 1991, overall intrastate
disparities - measured by the coefficient of variation30 - appeared
"to be greatest in industrialized, high-population states with substan
tial minority populations."31 These states, which include Illinois, New
28. In fact, a 1989-90 national study conducted by the National Center for Education
Statistics found that, on average, districts with the highest percentage of minorities spent the
most per pupil. See THOMAS B. PARRISH, h"T AL., DISPARITIES IN PuBLIC SCHOOL
DISTRICT SPENDING 1989-90, at 12 {National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics No. 95-300, 1995).
These figures, although quite surprising at first, turn out not to be particularly instructive.
The primary reason is that the figures do not account for different costs in urban districts.
The same study adjusted the figures to reflect cost differentials and concluded that districts
with the highest percentage of minorities spent the least, and districts with the lowest per
centage of minority students spent the most. See id. at 13-14. In addition, the study found
that total expenditures per student were higher in communities with higher socioeconomic
status, as measured by the value of housing and by education attainment. See id. at 11-12.
29. For the figures cited in this paragraph, see Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-67;
see also SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 23-24 (reporting that in both Missis

sippi and Maryland, data reveal that the lowest-spending districts tend to have the highest
concentrations of poor black students).
30. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation from the mean expenditure
divided by the mean. The standard deviation, in turn, is the average variation from the
mean of a distribution of numbers. The coefficient of variation thus takes into account the
expenditure levels of all districts within the state, and it records the standard deviation as a
percentage of the mean. Thus, if the coefficient of variation is 30%, then the average varia
tion from the mean is 30% of the mean. In plainer, bottom-line terms: the higher the coeffi
cient of variation, the greater the disparity among districts in a particular state. For a helpful
explanation, along with a sample illustration, see, e.g., RIDDLE & WHITE, supra note 12, at
5-6.
31. SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 21.
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Jersey, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas, also
have highly segregated schools.32 And within these states, the districts
with the lowest expenditures often had the highest percentage of mi
nority students, and those with the highest expenditures typically had
the highest percentage of white students.33 The disparities in these
states, which exist most dramatically between urban and suburban dis
tricts, probably explain why urban districts were involved in school fi
nance challenges in all of these states, a topic addressed below. For
now, however, I only note this evidence to round out the picture and
to acknowledge that using statewide averages as the relevant bench
mark can sometimes mask significant disparities among minority and
majority white districts.34
C.

Realities

What accounts for the surprising fact that most minority districts
appear to be funded at a level above their respective state averages?
One potential explanation is that race plays no role in school financ
ing, and that predominantly minority districts fare well in the political
process when it comes to capturing state educational funds. If this
were true, the increasing segregation among school districts and the
pursuit of single race schools would raise no serious financial implica
tions. But this explanation, while it may hold true in a couple of
states,35 does not appear generally persuasive.36

32 See id. at 21-22; see also Gary Or.field et al., Deepening Segregation in American
Public Schools (Harvard Project on School Desegregation, April 5, 1997) (listing states ac
cording to degree of segregation among districts). More recent data is consistent with the
findings reported in 1991. As of 1995, for example, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Michigan
still reported some of the largest disparities among district expenditures. See RIDDLE &
WHITE, supra note 12, at 10.
33. See SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 22-23 (discussing court findings
in New Jersey and Texas); see also W.Jiam E. Camp et. al., Within-District Equity: Desegre
gation and Microeconomic Analysis, in THE IMPACT'S OF LmGATION AND LEGISLATION ON
PuBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 273 (Julie Underwood & Deborah A. Verstegen eds., 1990) (de
scribing intradistrict spending disparities among black and white schools in Little Rock, St.
Louis, and Los Angeles).
34. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION
GOALS: BASELINE INDICATORS, 1990-91 85 (1992) [hereinafter BASELINE INDICATORS]
(reporting that, in 1990-91, the average per-pupil expenditure in the forty-seven largest ur
ban school systems was $5,200, compared to an average expenditure of $6,073 in suburban
schools and $5,476 in rural schools).
35. The two states in which this explanation may be true are, oddly enough given their
history, Virginia and Georgia. The school district in Richmond, Virginia, is 92% minority,
and it spends $1,100 per pupil over the state average. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at
66-67. The district receives no desegregation money, and the state finance scheme was up
held, so the additional funding is not traceable to a court order. See School Bd. of Richmond
v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim for Milliken II funding); Scott
v. Virginia, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (upholding school finance scheme). Similarly, Atlanta
is 93% minority, spends roughly $1,500 per pupil over the state average, and receives no de
segregation or any other court-ordered money. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156
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Rather, for many districts, the explanation appears to lie in
whether the district is receiving desegregation funding. Although I
was unable to gather information for all seventy-four districts, the
available evidence indicates that many predominantly minority dis
tricts with expenditure levels well above the statewide average receive
money from the state or federal government for "desegregation" pur
poses. The state funds are typically part of Milliken II remedies, while
the limited federal money comes from a federal program that provides
financial support for magnet schools.37 Districts such as Phoenix, Lit
tle Rock, Boston, Kansas City (Mo.), St. Louis, Cincinnati, Cleveland,
and Los Angeles all receive desegregation funding, and all spend
above their respective state averages.38 The correlation is far from
perfect, and there are some notable exceptions, such as Atlanta and
Richmond, both of which spend a great deal over their respective state
averages but neither of which receives desegregation funding.39
{Ga. 1981) (upholding state finance scheme); BASELINE INDICATORS, supra note 34, at 81;
Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64, 66.
36. Another alternative explanation that cannot be completely ruled out, but which is
also not facially persuasive, is that different property values and tax rates within these dis
tricts determine the different levels of funding. This explanation does not seem plausible,
for several reasons. First, as a general matter, property values in central cities have been
declining, particularly in the Northeast, as manufacturing and other businesses have left cen
iral cities. See Paul L. Tractenberg, A Tale of Two States: A Comparative Study of School
Finance and Educational Reform in California and New JeFSey 8-9 ( Dec. 5, 1997) (unpub
lished manuscript, on file with author). Yet some minority districts in the Northeast spend
above the state average (Boston), whereas others in the Northeast spend below the state
average {New York, Philadelphia). See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 65-66. Second, and
similarly, it is difficult to discern a pattern, geographical or otherwise, among the districts
that would suggest property values are playing an important role - i.e., the districts on ei
ther side of the line come from all geographical regions and include cities of differing sizes.
See id. Third, the possibility that cities receiving desegregation funding will be able to make
up the loss of funds with increased property taxes seems slim, in light of the evidence indi
cating that tax rates in urban areas are already higher than state averages and that compet
ing demands for social services in cities makes it difficult to raise additional resources for
education. See MARK G. YUDOF Er AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 658 {3 d ed.
1992); Tractenberg, supra, at 4-10.

37. See 20 U. S.C. § 3021 {1988).
38. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-67, 101 {Phoenix), 104 (Little Rock), 78-79
{Boston), 225 {Cleveland), 190-91 {Kansas City & St. Louis); BASELINE INDICATORS, supra
note 34, at 81. For a number of the districts, I was able to gather information about desegre
gation funding from relevant education officials. See Telephone Interview with Mark
Schrager, State Budget Office (June 29, 1998) (reporting that Los Angeles receives roughly
$400 million per year from the State to provide money for desegregation programs); Tele
phone Interview with John Mc Donough, State Board of Education (June 30, 1998) (report
ing that Boston receives roughly $55 million from the state for desegregation purposes);
Telephone Interview with Jerry Klekamp, Cincinnati School District (June 30, 1998) (re
porting that the State provides the Cincinnati School District roughly $5 million annually for
desegregation purposes); Telephone Interview with Richard Nielson, Director, Desegrega
tion Program, Oeveland School District (July 7, 1998) (reporting that, as part of desegrega
tion settlement, Oeveland will receive $295 million from the State over a period of seven
years).

39. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 66-67. Richmond appears to have benefited
from a school finance formula that devotes additional aid to districts with impoverished stu-
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The evidence nonetheless seems strong enough to discern a gen
eral trend, particularly when one examines the predominantly minor
ity districts that spend below the state average. Among these twenty
three districts, I have been able to gather information about seven
teen.40 Of these seventeen districts, only three (Chicago, San Fran
cisco, and Long Beach, California) were receiving desegregation
funding.41 The other fifteen were not. Thus, large city districts like
Baltimore, Philadelphia,42 New York, and Jersey City, all spent below
the statewide average and none received desegregation money.43 Al
though correlation does not prove causation, and although it is diffi
cult to know whether these districts are suffering financially because
of or despite their racial compositions, the pattern is still fairly strik
ing.
To the extent that desegregation funding is responsible for bloat
ing per-pupil expenditures in many predominantly minority districts,
several significant points follow. The first is that the relatively high
levels of spending among some predominantly minority districts may
be misleading. Although the myth regarding minority districts and
school funding is facially and currently inaccurate, it may actually be
close to reality, insofar as the myth appears to rest on an accurate sup
position regarding the political power of minority districts. That is to

dents. The school district's success is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that in 1987 it
unsuccessfully sought Milliken II money, despite the fact that it had already been declared
unitary. See School Bd. of Richmond, Va. v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308, 1314 (4th Cir. 1987)
(holding that because "we have found no vestiges of state-mandated segregation ... follow
ing a finding of unitary status, we affirm the court's refusal to order state funding of remedial
and compensatory programs").
40. For the figures on expenditures, see Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 66-67.
Through telephone interviews with state and local education officials, I was able to gather
information about desegregation funding in the following 8 districts: Long Beach (Tele
phone Interview of Maureen Cruz, District Budget director) (July 1, 1998); San Francisco
(Telephone Interview of Greg Bender, District Staff) (July 1, 1998); Chicago (Telephone
Interview of Joanna Koh, District Stuff) (June 30, 1998); East St. Louis (Telephone Inter
view of Richard Wells, District Staff) (June 30, 1998); Baltimore (Telephone Interview of
Charles Grissett, Chief Financial Officer of District) (June 30, 1998); Oklahoma City (Tele
phone Interview of Sand Henry, District Treasurer) (July 1, 1998); Houston (Telephone In
terview of Boon Chu, District Staff) (July 1, 1998); and Norfolk (Telephone Interview of Dr.
Mark Snitzer, District Staff) (July 1, 1998). I was also able to gather information about the
following nine districts: Camden, Jersey City, Paterson, Albuquerque, Providence, Bridge
port, New York, and Philadelphia. None of these districts, as far as I could tell, receives de
segregation funding. The first seven listed have never been subject to a desegregation de
cree; for information on New York and Philadelphia, see infra notes 47-49 and
accompanying text
41. See BASELINE INDICATORS, supra note 34, at 79, 81; telephone interviews and re
lated research, supra note 40.
42 See Pennsylvanian Human Relations Comm'n v. School Dist of Phila., 667 A.2d
1173, 1178 (Pa. Comm. Ct 1995) (addressing funding of desegregation decree for first time);
651 A.2d 186, 188 n.4 (Pa. Comm. Ct 1994) (postponing decision on desegregation funding).
43. See BASELINE INDICATORS, supra note 34, at 81 (Baltimore); Quality Counts, supra
note 21, at 215-16 (New York).
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say, underlying the myth that minority school districts are under
funded must be the assumption that heavily minority school districts
fare worse than white school districts when state legislatures divide up
school funds.44 This assumption is supported by the evidence regard
ing the relative positions of minority school districts receiving and not
receiving desegregation funding. The former, as a group, appear bet
ter off financially than the latter, but this advantage is traceable not to
success in the political process but to federal court orders. When fed
eral courts are absent from the scene, as is the case with the districts
not receiving desegregation money, heavily minority districts do not
seem to fare well in the political arena.
This dynamic is illustrated by contrasting several school districts:
Little Rock, Arkansas, which receives desegregation funding, and
Philadelphia and New York, which do not. Little Rock, partially as a
result of desegregation money,45 spends $1100 per pupil more than the
state average. The school district is sufficiently advantaged by this
funding scheme that it actually intervened on the side of the state in a
case challenging the state's school finance system, which was brought
by white rural districts.46
New York and Philadelphia, by contrast, are currently challenging
their respective state financing schemes. Both cities have high per
centages of minority students (79% and 83%, respectively), and both
spend $800 less per pupil than the state average (when costs are ad
justed).47 They are challenging their respective state's finance scheme
not only on the typical ground that the scheme violates the state con
stitutional educational clause, but also on the ground that the funding
scheme contravenes the regulations of Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Title VI prohibits any state entity (including a school dis
trict) that receives federal funds from discriminating on the basis of
race, and courts have interpreted implementing regulations as allow-

44. In referring to state legislatures dividing up school funds, I mean to include not only
the distribution of state education funds, but also the selection and maintenance of a school
finance scheme that relies on local property taxes for a large share of school funding.

45. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 839 F.2d 1296
(8th Cir. 1988) (ordering increased funding for Little Rock and other Pulaski county school
districts); see also MICHAEL A. REBELL ET AL., FISCAL EQUITY IN EDUCATION: A
PROPOSALFOR A DIALOGICREMEDY, at A-5 (1995) ("In 1989, the Legislature agreed, pur
suant to an order in the Little Rock school desegregation case [Pulask11, to allocate an addi
tional $131 million to Little Rock and other Pulaski county school districts beyond the regu
lar state aid to which the districts were entitled.").
46. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); see also Magnolia
Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ., 799 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Ark. 1990); REBELL
ET AL., supra note 45, at A-5 (noting that "[s]chool desegregation costs have . . . affected fis
cal equity reform in Arkansas").
47. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-67.
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ing for disparate impact claims.48
In both the New York and
Philadelphia cases, the minority districts have alleged that they do not
receive their fair share of state funding; both suits have survived mo
tions to dismiss and are pending in trial courts.49
The second, related point is that court-ordered desegregation
funding is temporary and is only guaranteed during the period of court
supervision. When desegregation decrees are lifted, this funding will
likely be reduced or perhaps cut altogether.50 Indeed, a number of dis
tricts and states have already entered into agreements under which the
state has agreed to pay the district a substantial sum over a period of
several years in exchange for being released from any further desegre
gation obligations - financial or otherwise. Typical of such agree
ments is the one struck in Kansas City, Missouri, where the state has
agreed to pay the district $314 million over three years in exchange for
the elimination of any further desegregation-related duties.
The
agreement has already sent district officials scrambling to cut money
from their budgets,51 and it has also sent white suburban students
scrambling back to the suburbs.52 Wells and Crain, at the conclusion

48. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 669-70 (N.Y.
1995). AJ; the court in Campaign for Fiscal Equity described: "A validly stated cause of ac
tion under the Title VI regulations thus has two components: 'whether a challenged practice
has a sufficiently adverse racial impact . . . and, if so, whether the practice is nevertheless
adequately justified," id. at 670 (quoting Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F.
Supp. 1518, 1523 (D. Ala. 1991)); accord Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist, 868
F.2d 750, 754 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989); Georgia State Conferences of Branches of NAACP v.
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
49. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs stated claim
under Title VI and its implementing regulations); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at
670 & n.9 (noting that plaintiffs alleged that minority students in New York, as a result of
state funding formula, received 12% less in state aid than state-wide average).
50. See Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains,
Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY LJ. 759, 769 (1993) ("School districts should further consider
the loss of court-ordered funding, often called Milliken II funding, in deciding to file for
declarations of unitary status." (footnote omitted)).
51. See Caroline Hendrie, Falling Stars, EDUC.
<http://www.edweek.org!ew/vol-17/24kc2.hl7>.

WK. ON THE WEB

(Feb. 25, 1998)

52 See Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in Kansas City, in GARY ORFIELD ET AL.,
(1996); Jeanne Ponessa, Missouri Is Trying to Free
Itself from Subsidizing Costly Desegregation Programs in Kansas City and St. Louis, in
Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 190-93. Kansas City also provides a good illustration of the
political dynamic that seems to be at work with regard to minority districts and funding. The
Kansas City School District at one time was predominantly white, but eventually became
majority black, despite the fact that the City population remained majority white. AJ; Elaine
R. Jones reports, "from almost precisely the moment the school district became majority
black, the majority white electorate consistently voted against bond issues and tax levies,
precipitating a catastrophic decline in the capital and educational resources of the school
district." Elaine R. Jones, Foreword to ORFIELD ET AL., supra, at viii. This decline was ar
rested by the extensive "desegregation" remedies ordered by a federal court, which brought
into the district a remarkable amount of additional funding. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515
U.S. 70, 78-80 (1995). But now that the desegregation decree is terminating, it appears that
the additional funding will be reduced, and the district may end up in the same place that it
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 241, 262
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of their St. Louis case study, predict a similar end to the St. Louis de
segregation decree, asserting that "[t]he removal of the court order
would no doubt be the beginning of the end of extra state resources to
the city schools."53 An editorial writer in St. Louis was even more
blunt: "Not many things in life are certain, but count on this much: If
the desegregation program ends, and the sun rises in the east, the
State of Missouri will most assuredly not gratuitously pump into the
city the . . . extra desegregation dollars it now spends under the court
order."54
Once court-ordered desegregation decrees are lifted, districts that
have been receiving additional funding through court orders will likely
be unable to secure the same level of funding from state legislatures.
Given the lackluster performance of districts that have received addi
tional desegregation funds,55 state legislatures are not likely to be sym
pathetic to the argument that the flow of additional money should
continue. Indeed, the reason states are seeking a court declaration of
unitary status is presumably to be relieved of their desegregation obli
gations, including any attendant financial responsibilities. It thus
seems implausible that state officials would turn around and devote
the money saved from the termination of the desegregation plan to the
schools that benefited from the plan.56 In fact, it seems just as likely, if
not more, that these districts will face a takeover by the state rather
than increased funding if their achievement levels remain low.57
started. That this majority black district received additional funding only because of court
order cannot be gainsaid.
53. See AMY STUART WELLS & ROBERT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVER THE COLOR LINE:
AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WJilTE SUBURBAN SCHOOLS 336 (1997). Wells and

Crain tie this prediction specifically to racial politics: "The racial politics of Missouri, with
its mostly white and rural constituents, makes it difficult for elected officials to fund urban
educational programs in the absence of court orders that say they must." Id. at 114; see also
Caroline Hendrie, Judge Ends Desegregation Case in Cleveland, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB
(Apr. 8, 1998) <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/30cleve.h17> (court declares Cleveland
"unitary," but rules that state and district must fulfill earlier agreement to provide $40 mil
lion a year in extra state funding until the year 2000).
54. Ray Hartman,

In Defense of Desegregation:

Separate Won't Be Equal, THE

RIVERFRONT TIMEs, Oct. 6-12, 1993, at 2.
55.

See, e.g., Morantz, supra note 52, at 260; Ryan, supra note 9, at 289-93.

56. Wells & Crain make this point with regard to efforts by the State to terminate the
desegregation plan in St. Louis. As they observe, "[s]tate and local politicians are on a mis
sion to end the [desegregation] case for political and economic reasons. . . . Thus, the idea
that any state money not spent on desegregation would be spent on schools, particularly ur
ban schools, seems a little farfetched." WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 53, at 336-37.
57. Twenty-one districts have already been taken over by state or city officials in recent
years.
See Race and Takeovers, EDUC. WK. ON THE WEB (Jan. 14, 1998)
<http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-17/18minsl.h17>. Of these districts, all but three are pre
dominantly minority, and over half are more than 80% minority. See id. An additional eight
districts have been threatened with a takeover, and six of these are predominantly minority
districts. See id. State officials consistently deny that race plays any role in the takeovers,
but black and Hispanic school board members just as consistently suggest that they are being
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Insofar as minority districts do not fare particularly well in the po
litical process when it comes to securing school funds, school finance
litigation, which is designed to circumvent the political process and re
direct the flow of funds to poorer districts, increases in importance.
As the next two Parts reveal, however, school finance litigation has
not proven very rewarding to minority school districts.

II.

MINORITY DISTRICTS AND SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION

This Part examines the success, or lack thereof, experienced by
minority districts in school finance litigation. It is important to em
phasize at the outset that a number of urban minority districts have
not participated in school finance challenges brought in their states.58
Part of the explanation lies, again, in desegregation funding, which has
tended to boost expenditure levels in minority districts and has ren
dered some districts poor candidates for plaintiffs in school finance
litigation. Thus, urban districts such as Phoenix, Denver, Boston,
Minneapolis, and St. Paul did not participate in the school finance
challenges brought in their states.
Little Rock and Nashville
Davidson County did participate in school finance cases - but as in
tervenors on the side of the state. This is not to say that all urban dis
tricts receiving desegregation funding stayed on the sidelines in school
finance cases; the disparities between urban and suburban districts are
sufficient enough in some states that some Milliken II districts signed
on as plaintiffs in school finance challenges. But the urban (and rural)
minority districts that did join school finance challenges - including
Newark, Camden, Jersey City, Hartford, Philadelphia, New York, Bal
timore, and Providence - typically were not receiving any desegrega
tion funding.59

singled out for discriminatory treatment See Beth Reinhard, Racial Issues Cloud State
Takeovers, Eouc. WK. ON THE WEB (Jan. 14, 1998) <http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/
18minor.h17>.
58. Most of the cases, as will be discussed below, have been brought by suburban or ru
ral districts. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota is under the impression that
school finance challenges are typically brought by urban districts. See Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 302 (Minn. 1993) ("Unlike challenges to state financing of education in other
states, which frequently have been initiated by property-poor inner-city districts, this case
does not involve the three largest metropolitan school districts, Minneapolis, St. Paul, and
Duluth."). This may be reading too much into one errant comment, but that the Minnesota
court would make this (incorrect) observation suggests both that popular perception may
envision school finance plaintiffs as urban minority districts and that the type of district in
volved weighs on the minds of judges adjudicating these suits.
59. See supra note 40.
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Successful and Unsuccessful School Finance Plaintiffs

Before examining the demographics of school districts involved in
school finance litigation, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of
school finance litigation as a whole. Commentators divide school fi
nance litigation into three phases, or waves, which are not as mono
lithic as commentators suggest but which nonetheless help in explain
ing the basic progression of the litigation.60 The first phase involved
federal and state court challenges to education financing systems
based on the federal Equal Protection Clause. This phase was short
lived. It began with a successful challenge in 1971 to California's fi
nancing scheme in Serrano v. Priest.61 It ended two years later with the
Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, in which the Court held that school funding inequities do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.62 With the federal Constitu
tion foreclosed as a source for their challenges, school finance plain
tiffs turned to state constitutions.
The second phase began shortly after Rodrigu.,ez, when the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Robinson v. Cahill,63 declared the education
financing scheme in New Jersey unconstitutional on the ground that it
violated the state constitution's "thorough and efficient education"
clause. The cases in this phase generally focused on the education and
equal protection clauses in state constitutions and generally sought
equalized funding per pupil.64 Court results in the second phase were

60. See, e.g., Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance
Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 115366 (1995) (describing three waves of school finance litigation); William E. Thro, Judicial
Analysis During the Third Wave ofSchool Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as
a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 598 n.4 (1994) (same); Julie K. Underwood & William E.
Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave ofReform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
517, 520-35 (1991) (same).
61. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) ("Serrano I'') (finding that wealth is a
suspect classification and education a fundamental right, and striking down property-based
funding scheme on state and federal equal protection grounds).
62. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
63. 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (holding that
financing scheme violates state equal protection provision); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980) (holding state finance scheme in violation of state
equal protection clause on the ground that education is a fundamental right and wealth a
suspect classification); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) ("Horton I") (holding
that state equal protection and education clauses require substantial equality in funding edu
cation); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) ("Serrano II") (rejecting legislative re
sponse to Serrano I on the ground that it did not provide sufficient assurance of equalization;
legislative scheme had to ensure that funding would vary no more than $100 per pupil), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
64.
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mixed: of the twenty challenges resolved by state supreme courts,
thirteen were rejected,65 and seven were successful.66
The third and current phase of school finance litigation began in
1989 with a couple of significant court victories in Kentucky67 and
Montana.68 The third wave cases are for the most part characterized
by a strict focus on state education clauses and an emphasis on ade
quacy rather than equity - the claim made, in other words, is not that
each student is entitled to equal funding, but rather that all students
are entitled to funding sufficient to provide an "adequate" education.69
65. Challenges were rejected in the following states: Arizona, see Shofstall v. Hollins,
515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973) (rejecting equal protection challenge to financing scheme, despite
declaring education a fundamental right); Colorado, see Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (holding that education is not a fundamental right and
that state education clause does not require uniform expenditure levels); Georgia, see
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981) (upholding state financing scheme and con
cluding that "adequate education" clause requires more than minimum education, but that
the Legislature must determine content of adequate education); Idaho, see Thompson v. En
gelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975) (upholding finance scheme against challenge based on
state equal protection and education clauses); Maryland, see Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (rejecting challenge based on state equal protection
and "thorough and efficient" education clauses); New York, see Board of Educ. v. Nyquist,
439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982) (upholding scheme on ground that education clause is not a
mandate of equality and that education is not a fundamental right); North Carolina, see Britt
v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 361
S.E.2d 71 (1987) (upholding scheme on ground that "general and uniform" education clause
only guarantees equal access to schools, and "equal opportunity" provision only bars racial
segregation); Ohio, see Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979) (rejecting
challenges based on equal protection and "thorough and efficient" education clauses on
ground that Legislature has discretion in educational matters, with which court will not inter
fere where education appears adequate); Oklahoma, see Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987) (rejecting challenge based on state equal protection and education
clauses); Oregon, see Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976) (rejecting challenge based on
state equal protection and education clauses); Pennsylvania, see Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d
360 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting challenge based on state equal protection and "thorough and effi
cient" education clauses); South Carolina, see Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470
(S.C. 1988) (rejecting challenge based on state education and equal protection clauses);
Washington, see Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974) (re
jecting challenge based on state constitution's education and equal protection provisions).
66. Successful challenges were brought in the following states: Arkansas, see Dupree,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); California, see Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 929; Connecticut, see Hor
ton I, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); New Jersey, see Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.
1973) ("Robinson I''); Washington, see Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash.
1978) (invalidating school finance scheme, without reversing Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, on the
ground that education clause requires provision of basic education); West Virginia, see
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that school financing scheme must be
adequate, based on "thorough and efficient" education clause, and equal, based on equal
protection clause); Wyoming, see Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d
310 (Wyo. 1980) (holding that school financing scheme failed to ensure equal educational
opportunity as required by state equal protection and education clauses).
67.

See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

68.

See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).

69. See Thro, supra note 60, at 603. Thro contends that in the current wave of cases,
"instead of emphasizing equality of expenditures, the plaintiffs have argued that all children
are entitled to an education of a least a certain quality and that more money is necessary to
bring the worst school districts up to the minimum level mandated by the state education
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The shift in focus from equality to adequacy was in some cases a
matter of choice or strategy, and in other cases a matter of necessity,
as litigants who had already lost on an equality claim returned to court
for a second or third time. The results in the so-called third wave have
also been mixed, although the win-loss ratio, at eleven wins70 and
eleven losses,71 is better than that of the second phase.72

clause." Id.; see also Heise, supra note 60, at 1153 (noting that "the third wave illustrates the
replacement of traditional 'equity' court decisions with 'adequacy' decisions").
70. Successful challenges have been brought in Alabama, see Opinion of the Justices No.
338, 624 So.2d 107 (Ala. 1993) (advisory opinion directing state senate to follow trial court
order, which found financing scheme unconstitutional); Arizona, see Roosevelt Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (invalidating system for funding school
facilities after finding that funding scheme causes "gross disparities and creates inadequate
educational opportunities"); Kentucky, see Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (invalidating the
"whole gamut" of the state's education system, including its financing structure, on ground
that it violated equality and quality requirements derived from the state constitution's edu
cation clause); Massachusetts, see McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993) (holding that property-tax based financing scheme violated state education clause,
which requires the state to "cherish" the public schools); Montana, see Helena Elementary,
769 P.2d at 690 {holding that substantial funding disparities violated state education clause,
which guarantees equal educational opportunities); New Hampshire, see Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) {holding that financing scheme violated state
constitution's education and taxation clauses); New Jersey, see Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d
359 (N.J. 1990) ("Abbott II") (holding that revised funding scheme still violated the state
education clause); Ohio, see DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (holding that
school finance scheme did not guarantee adequate education and therefore violated state
education clause); Tennessee, see Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that state finance scheme, which resulted in funding disparities and
was justified only by local control of education, violated rational basis test derived from state
equal protection clause); Texas, see Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391
(Tex. 1989) ("Edgewood I") (holding that finance scheme violated state's "efficient system"
education clause, which the court interpreted to require substantially equal access to educa
tion funding); Vermont, see Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997) (holding that school
finance scheme violated state equal protection and education provisions, which guarantee
substantial equality of educational opportunity).
71. Challenges were rejected by the following state supreme courts: Florida, see Coali
tion for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996) (reject
ing challenge on ground that judicial interference with school funding would violate separa
tion of powers doctrine); Illinois, see Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (111. 1999)
{holding that state education clause does not guarantee minimally adequate education);
Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1 178 (Ill. 1996) (rejecting challenge based
on state education and equal protection clauses); Maine, see School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v.
Commissioner, Dept. of Educ., 659 A.2d 854 (Me. 1995) (holding that finance scheme did
not violate state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Minnesota, see Skeen v. State,
505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (rejecting challenge to financing scheme based on state equal
protection and education clauses); Nebraska, see Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993)
{dismissing claims that spending disparities violated state constitutional rights on grounds
that plaintiffs failed to allege that disparities caused educational inadequacies); North
Dakota, see Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) (finding by a
majority vote that finance scheme violated state equal protection clause, but upholding
scheme because supermajority necessary to strike down legislation as unconstitutional);
Oregon, see Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991) (re
jecting challenges based on state constitutional provisions on grounds that recent constitu
tional amendment regulating local property taxation presupposes use of local revenues to
fund schools); Rhode Island, see City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I, 1995)
(holding that finance scheme did not violate either education clause or equal protection pro-
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All told, then, eighteen state supreme courts have struck down
their respective states' school finance schemes, while eighteen have
upheld their states' schemes.73 Of the eighteen successful cases, only a
single one
in New Jersey - was brought by predominantly minority
urban districts.74 Two others, in Arizona75 and Texas,76 were brought
-

vision of state constitution); Virginia, see Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994)
(holding that state constitution does not mandate substantially equal school funding); Wis
consin, see Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (rejecting challenge based on state
equal protection and education clauses and holding that education is a fundamental right but
equal funding is not).
72. At least four of the victories, however, came in cases based on equality rather than
adequacy theories. See Brigham, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Helena Elementary, 769 P.2d 684
(Mont. 1989); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood I, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
73. See supra notes 64-66 and 70-71, for a complete list of state supreme court decisions.
It is worth noting that in three of the states where school finance litigation was initially un
successful, second-round suits have met with some limited success. The Supreme Courts of
New York, North Carolina, and South Carolina upheld their respective state financing
schemes against "equity" challenges. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y.
1982); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), ap
peal dismissed for lack of substantial constitutional question, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987);
Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 {S.C. 1988). In each of these three states,
however, the supreme courts have allowed subsequent adequacy challenges to go forward,
and litigation is still pending in lower courts. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) {allowing plaintiffs to go forward in case claiming that school
finance scheme denies students the right to a minimally adequate education and violates Ti
tle VI); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997) {holding that students have a constitu
tional right to a sound, basic education and allowing suit to proceed); Abbeville County Sch.
Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 {S.C. 1999) (reversing dismissal of complaint and holding that
state constitution guarantees minimally adequate education).
74. See Abbott II, 575 A2d at 387 (noting that 71 % of state's minorities were educated
in plaintiff districts, which were themselves predominantly minority).
75. See Roosevelt Elementary. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
The National Center for Education Statistics provides data on the racial and ethnic composi
tions of all school districts nationwide. See School District Data Book Profiles: 1989-1990
(visited Mar. 22, 1999) <http://govinfo.kerr.orst.edu/sddb-stateis.html> [hereinafter School
District Data Book]. Data on relevant school districts was obtained by identifying the plain
tiff school districts, usually through a court decision, and then looking up the districts' demo
graphics in the Data Book Profiles. For ease of reference, I will cite to the decisions and the
Data Book for the relevant demographic figures. In the Arizona case, 'the lead plaintiff was
the Roosevelt School District, which is 68% Hispanic, 24% black, and 8% white. Additional
plaintiff districts were also predominantly Hispanic. See Roosevelt, 877 P.2d. at 806; School
District Data Book, supra, at Arizona.
76. The Texas litigation was filed by 68 school districts. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at
391-92. Although the lead plaintiff district, Edgewood, was a predominantly white rural dis
trict, the majority of districts apparently were predominantly black or Hispanic. See
SHORTCHANGING CHILDREN, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that "evidence in the record indi
cated that the plaintiffs, property-poor districts, had high concentrations of black and His
panic and low-income children"). The fact that Edgewood was brought by a coalition not
entirely composed of minority districts could justify classifying this case as one involving a
mixed coalition rather than minority districts. But given that most of ·the districts were mi
nority, and given the relation between ethnicity and school district poverty, of which there
was evidence in the court record, it seems appropriate to classify this as a case brought and
won by minority districts. See id. {"The record in Edgewood further indicated that Mexi
can-Americans comprised 95 percent of students in the poorest Texas districts, although
they were only 30 percent of the total enrollment statewide.").
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by suburban and rural minority districts. And a fourth, in Washing
ton, was brought by an integrated urban district - Seattle.77
The majority of successful challenges were brought by suburban or
rural white districts, in states such as West Virginia,78 Wyoming,79
Connecticut,80 Arkansas,81 Kentucky,82 Montana,83 Tennessee,84 New
Hampshire,85 Idaho,86 and Vermont.87 In Massachusetts, the challenge
was brought by a coalition of sixteen rural and urban districts (ex
cluding Boston); thirteen were predominantly white, and three were

77. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d. 71, 78 (Wash. 1978) (identifying plain
tiff district); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Washington (reporting statistics on
demographics of plaintiff district).
78. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 861 (W. Va. 1979) (identifying plaintiffs as par
ents of children attending public schools of Lincoln County); School District Data Book, su
pra note 75, at West Virginia, Lincoln County (reporting statistics on the racial composition
of the Lincoln County District).
79. See Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 310, 317 (Wyo.
1980) (identifying three districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at
Wyoming (reporting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
80. The Connecticut litigation was initially brought by Canton, a predominantly white,
rural district. See Horton I, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); School District Data Book, supra
note 75, at Connecticut, Canton School District. In Horton I, the Connecticut Supreme
Court struck down the state's finance scheme. Plaintiffs were not satisfied with the subse
quent legislative response and returned to court. See Horton v. Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099
(Conn. 1985) ("Horton II"). Lower courts allowed Hartford - a predominantly minority,
urban district-to intervene, a decision which was upheld by the supreme court. See id. In
the same decision, the supreme court also upheld the legislative response and rejected Can
ton and Hartford's challenge. See id.
81. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983) (listing eleven
plaintiff school districts); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Arkansas (reporting
statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
82 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989) (identi
fying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Kentucky (reporting
statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
83. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 684 (Mont. 1989)
(identifying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Montana (re
porting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
84. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1993)
(identifying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Tennessee (re
porting statistics on racial composition of the school districts involved); see also Lewis R.
Donelson, School Finance Litigation: A Rural Perspective, 61 TENN. L. REV. 445 (1994).
85. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.H. 1993) (identifying districts involved). New
Hampshire has no majority minority districts. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 202-03.
86. See Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 728 (Idaho
1993) (identifying districts involved). Idaho has no majority minority school districts. See
School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Idaho.
87. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). Vermont has no majority minority
school districts. See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Vermont.
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predominantly Hispanic.88 In two states, Alabama89_ and California,90
challenges were brought on behalf of all school children not receiving
a constitutionally sufficient education. And in a third state, Ohio, the
successful plaintiff was a huge coalition of 553 districts.91
On the other side of .the ledger, in the eighteen states where plain
tiffs were unsuccessful, there were nineteen relevant cases all told with the Illinois Supreme Court twice rejecting school finance suits.92
Of the nineteen cases, seven were brought either exclusively by urban
minority districts, or by a small group of plaintiffs that included at
least one urban minority district. New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Milwaukee, East St. Louis (lli.), Providence, and Richland County
(S.C.) all sued and lost.93 Predominantly Hispanic suburban and rural
districts filed an unsuccessful case in Colorado, and a predominantly
minority (African-American and Native American) rural district lost a
school finance challenge in North Carolina.94 Four of the other ten
88. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ, 615 N.E.2d 516, 516 (Mass.
1993) (identifying school districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at
Massachusetts (reporting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
89. See Ex parte James, 713 So.2d 869, 872 (Ala. 1997) (consolidating seven lawsuits
brought by a coalition of 25 school systems and a statewide class of all children enrolled in
those public schools providing less than a minimally adequate education).
90.

See Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal.

1971) (identifying plaintiff class); see

also

RICHARD F. ELMORE & MlLBREY WALLIN MCLAUGHLIN, REFORM AND RETRENCH

MENT: THE PoLmcs OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1982).
91. The case was filed by the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy, which "repre
sent[ed] the 553 school systems that [were] party to the lawsuit." Mark Skertic, School
Funding System Faces Big Test, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 9, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL
2258946; see also DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 777 (Ohio 1997). It is worth noting that
the first suit challenging the Ohio finance scheme was unsuccessful. See Board of Educ. of
Cincinnati v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1999). That case was brought by students, par
ents, and administrators in the Cincinnati School District. See id. at 815.

92 See Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672
N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996). Two additional "school finance" cases were rejected by the Illinois
Supreme Court but are not included here because they only tangentially touched on the is
sue and the court did not address the constitutionality of the entire funding scheme. The
first, People ex rel Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767 (Ill. 1976), was a suit brought by the state
to collect taxes on farmers. In their defense, the farmers argued, inter alia, that the school
funding formula was unconstitutional, but they failed to offer any proof. The Illinois Su
preme Court rejected the claim "[b]ecause of this failure of proof." Id. at 775-76. The sec
ond, Blase v. Illinois, 302 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973), involved a claim that the state must pay at
least 50% of education costs, which the court rejected.
93. See Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798 (Ill. 1999); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun,
662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I. 1995); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C. 1988).
Richland County, which includes Columbia, is predominantly urban. See School District
Data Book, supra note 75, at South Carolina, Richland County; see also School District Data
Book, supra note 75 (providing relevant statistics on racial composition of district).
94. See Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1011 (Colo. 1982); Britt v. North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), appeal dismissed for lack
ofsubstantial constitutional question, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987). In Colorado, plaintiffs were
a group of 16 school districts: Alamosa, Center, Del Norte, Delta East Otero, Granada,
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losing cases were filed by mainly rural white districts - in Georgia,95
Nebraska,96 Virginia,97 and North Dakota.98 Five were brought by
fairly large coalitions of mainly white rural and suburban districts - in
Oregon,99 Oklahoma,100 Minnesota,101 Florida,102 and Maine.103 And
one, finally, was brought by a large coalition of school districts in Illi
nois, which included rural white districts and urban minority districts,
such as East St. Louis and Chicago.104
Ignacio, Johnstown, Mazanola, Monte Vista, Montezuma, Montrose, Pueblo, Rocky Ford,
South Conejos, and Trinidad. Eight of these were predominantly Hispanic, and another four
were over 35% Hispanic. See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Colorado (statis
tics on the racial composition of the school districts involved). One of the attorneys involved
in the case stated that the attorneys specifically sought out Hispanic districts as plaintiffs.
See Interview with David Long, Attorney for Plaintiffs (Feb. 26, 1998). In North carolina,
the challenge was brought by students and parents in the Robeson County School District,
see Britt, 357 S.E.2d at 432, which was 28% African-American and 44% Native American.
See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Robeson County.
95. See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981) {identifying school districts
involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Georgia (reporting statistics on racial
composition of the relevant school districts);
96. See Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 350 {Neb. 1993) {identifying districts involved);
see also School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Nebraska (reporting statistics on the
racial composition of the school districts involved).
97. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 139 n.2 {Va. 1994) {identifying districts
involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Virginia (reporting statistics on the
racial composition of the school districts involved).
98. See Bismark Pub. Sch. Dist. #1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 247 (N.D. 1994) (identifying
districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note 75, at North Dakota (reporting
statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
99. See Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116, 117 n.1 {Or.
1991) (stating that a coalition of 55 districts sued the state). There are no majority-minority
districts in Oregon, and Portland, the one large urban district, is "one of the state's wealtltier
districts." See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 230; see also School District Data Book, su
pra note 75, at Oregon.
100. See Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1137-38 {Okla. 1987) (noting that
plaintiffs represented boards of education and students in 38 districts). According to Plain
tiff/Appellant's Brief, on file witlt autltor, plaintiff districts included a few urban districts.
Aside from Tulsa, however, which enrolls over 40,000 students, the districts classified as "ur
ban" are quite small - Norman and Sand Springs, for example, are "urban" districts, but
enroll only 12,000 and 5,000 students respectively. See School District Data Book, supra note
75, at Oklahoma, at Tulsa, Norman, and Sand Springs Districts .
101. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 301, 302
involved).

(Minn.

1993) {describing 76 districts

102. See Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d
400, 402 n.1 {Fla. 1996) {identifying districts involved); School District Data Book, supra note
75, at Florida (reporting statistics on the racial composition of the school districts involved).
103. See School Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Commissioner, Dept. of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 855
(Me. 1995) (stating that 83 districts sued the state). Maine has no majority minority districts.
See School District Data Book, supra note 75, at Maine.
104. See Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996). Ninety
seven districts were involved in the case. See id. at 1180. According to one of plaintiffs' at
torneys, the districts included botlt rural white and urban minority districts, such as Chicago
and East St. Louis. See Telephone Interview witlt Patricia Brannan, Attorney for Plaintiff
(Sept. 20, 1999).
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Assessing the Evidence

In sum, predominantly minority districts have won only three of
the twelve school finance challenges (25%) in which they were plain
tiffs. Predominantly white districts, by contrast, have won eleven of
fifteen cases (73 % ) if one excludes the cases involving large coalitions
of districts, or twelve of twenty (60%) if one includes the five cases in
volving large coalitions of districts, most of which were predominantly
white. While the different levels of success - 25% for minority dis
tricts versus 73 % or 60% for white districts - seem significant in
themselves, perhaps the most revealing evidence comes from isolating
the performance of urban minority districts. In the eight states in
which urban minority districts have been plaintiffs, only one state su
preme court has overturned the state's financing scheme, for a success
rate of 12.5%.
It is safe to say, then, that minority districts have not fared par
ticularly well in court and that urban minority districts have fared es
pecially poorly. Although other factors aside from the racial composi
tion obviously could explain the results, it is possible at least to reject
one alternative explanation: constitutional text. Education provisions
in state constitutions differ in their formulation; some guarantee the
right to a "thorough and efficient" education,105 others the right to a
"general and uniform" education,106 and still others the right to an
education described by one or a combination of the four terms thor
ough, efficient, general, and uniform.107 Some commentators have
suggested that the constitutional text is determinative in school fi-

105. See, e.g., Mo. CONST. art VIII, § 1 ("The General Assembly . . . shall by Law es
tablish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools . . . .") ;
N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 'll l ("The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and sup
port of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools . . . .").

106. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIIl, § 1 ("[I]t is the duty of the legislature to establish
a general and uniform system of public schools."); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("The Legisla
tive Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform, and general system of
Common schools.").
107. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("The general assembly shall, as soon as practi
cable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of
free public schools . . . ."); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("The General Assembly shall provide for
the establishment and maintenance of a general and efficient system of free public
schools . . • .") ; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform system of free public schools . . . ."). Other state constitutions simply call for the
establishment of public schools. See, e.g., HAw. CONST. art X, § 1 ("The State shall provide
for the establishment, support and control of a statewide system of public schools . . . .");
ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256 ("The legislature shall establish, organize and maintain a lib
eral system of public schools.").
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nance cases,108 but even a brief comparison of the cases belies this as
sertion.109
The constitutions of New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and West Virginia, for example, all guarantee the right to a "thorough
and efficient" education.110 Suffice it to say that the outcomes of
school finance cases in these states, as well as the courts' interpreta
tions of what this vague constitutional language requires, have differed
significantly.111 Similarly, the strength or specificity of the constitu
tional language does not correspond with the outcomes in cases. The
Georgia Supreme Court, for example, held that the education clause
contained in the Georgia Constitution, which explicitly provides that
"an adequate education" shall be "a primary obligation of the State,''
does not create a judicially enforceable right.112 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court, on the other hand, interpreted its state education
clause - which admonishes the state to "cherish . . . public schools" to impose upon the Legislature a duty to provide all students an ade
quate education, the components of which the court listed in detail.113
To the considerable extent that constitutional text is not responsi
ble for the different outcomes in school finance cases, non-textual ex
planations obviously increase in importance.114
One explanation

108. See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 309 n.3 {1991) ("The language of the education arti
cle plays a primary role in its interpretation.").
109. Other commentators, and at least one court, have reached the same conclusion.
See, e.g., Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analyses ofPublic School Finance Re·
form Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 129, 153-54 (1992) ("This lack of any
discernible relationship between the strength of commitment to education in the state consti
tution and the success rate of school finance challenges makes it clear that the outcome of
these cases does not depend on the interpretation of the constitution involved."); William E.
Thro, The Role of Language ofthe State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79
ED. LAW REP. 19, 22 {1993) (acknowledging that "the distinctions between education
clauses apparently have not made a difference in those school finance cases decided between
1973 and 1992," but suggesting that "there is no reason why the language of the educational
clauses should not be an important factor in future school finance cases"); Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 777-80 {Md. 1983) (canvassing the text of edu
cation clauses and the resulting school finance decisions from other states).
110. See NJ. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 'l!l; MD CONST. art. VIII, §1; PENN. CONST. art 3, §
14; Omo CONST. art. VI, § 2; w. vA. CONST. art. 12, § 1.
111. See Abbott II, 575 A2d 359 {NJ. 1990) (overturning finance scheme); Hornbeck v.
Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (upholding finance scheme); Dan
son v. Casey, 359 A.2d 360 (Penn. 1979) (upholding finance scheme); DeRolph v. State, 677
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1979) (overturning finance scheme); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 f.>V.
Va. 1979) (overturning finance scheme).
112. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166 (Ga. 1981).
113. McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 526, 554 (Mass. 1993).
114. See Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems ofFairness, 30 VAL. U.
L. REV. 459, 468 (1996). Professor Kahn argues that it is "hard to find significant differences
among the cases to explain the outcomes. Outcomes do not seem to depend upon differ
ences in the state programs. Nor are the different outcomes explained by differences in con-
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worth consideration and further study is the racial composition of the
litigating school district.115 There may indeed be alternative explana
tions as to why urban minority districts almost never win school fi
nance cases, while rural and suburban white districts win such cases
more often than not. But race cannot be dismissed out of hand as a
possible explanation of disparate court results, given the low rate of
success among minority districts as compared to that among white dis
tricts. As described presently, neither can race be dismissed as incon
sequential with regard to legislative responses to court decisions.
ill. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES

Court-ordered changes in school finance schemes entail increasing
education expenditures overall, redistributing existing resources, or
both. It is therefore not surprising that court decisions declaring
school finance systems unconstitutional typically provoke some con
troversy and legislative opposition.116 This Part assesses whether there
is any noticeable difference in either the degree of opposition or the
quality of the legislative response when minority districts prevail in
court. Measuring legislative recalcitrance is necessarily an imprecise
endeavor, and, as with court decisions, there are a number of potential
reasons why legislatures might actively oppose or remain unresponsive
to court orders. But just as with court decisions, there is again a dis-

stitutional text, history, or some legal measure of the importance of education within each
state." Id.

115. Another possible explanation is that the type of district matters most: the cases
indicate that urban districts do poorly and suburban or rural districts do relatively well in
school finance litigation. The difficulty with this explanation is that it is usually impossible to
disentangle race from the type of district involved - i.e., urban districts are typically minor
ity, and suburban or rural districts are typically white. Only one case was brought by an in
tegrated urban district - Seattle, Washington - and there plaintiffs prevailed. Similarly,
only four cases were brought by rural or suburban minority districts; two, in Texas and Ari
zona, were successful, and two, in Colorado and North Carolina, were unsuccessful. See su
pra notes 75, 76, and 94 for citation and discussion of these cases. This limited evidence
points in different directions: rural and suburban minority districts were obviously more
successful, in terms of percentages, than were urban minority districts, but so too were inte
grated urban districts. The mixed results, combined with the fact that the sample of cases is
so small, makes it difficult to draw inferences. Whether racial composition or urbanicity is
more significant, therefore, cannot be resolved from this admittedly crude approach of tal
lying wins and losses.
116. Part of the opposition is all but invited by the court decisions, which often wax
grandiloquent in describing the rights involved and wane to the point of silence when it
comes to specifying a remedy. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A
Federal Courts Perspective on the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 543, 544
(1994) (describing how "state supreme courts show [a] pattern of expansive declarations of
right and duty coupled with an insistence tha! solutions must come from the legislative
rather than the judicial branch"); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies in
State Courts, 104 HARV. L REV. 1072, 1072 (1991) (arguing that "legislative inertia and un
warranted judicial deference to political branches in the remedial phase hinder the school
finance plaintiff's prospects for securing a constitutional remedy").
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cernible pattern in legislative responses: minority districts that were
successful in court faced protracted legislative battles that were more
intense and longer-lasting than those typically faced by successful
white districts. In addition, existing research regarding two of the
states where school finance challenges were won by minority districts
- New Jersey and Texas - suggests that significant segments of the
public viewed subsequent legislative reforms in racial terms, regardless
of the actual scope and targets of those reforms, and that whites and
minorities differed significantly in their support of or opposition to
equalization efforts. I will begin with the experience of minority dis
tricts, and then move on to contrast this experience with that of a
number of white districts.
A.

When Minority Districts Win in Court

Predominantly minority districts have successfully challenged
school finance systems in three states - New Jersey, Texas, and
Arizona. In each of the three states, which I will discuss in tum, pro
tracted legislative battles ensued, prompting numerous returns to
court. In New Jersey, the court and legislative battles over school fi
nance reform have been ongoing for over twenty-five years and are by
now legendary.117 There have been two different cases, Robinson v.
Cahill and Abbott v. Burke, but they are both of a single piece.
The Robinson litigation began in 1970. In 1973, the New Jersey
Supreme Court issued its first decision in the case, finding that the
state's system of public school funding violated the constitutional
guarantee of a "thorough and efficient" education.118 The case went
before the supreme court on six additional occasions, primarily be
cause the Legislature refused to comply with the court's order to ame
liorate the disparities caused by the state's finance system.119 The
Legislature finally enacted the Public School Education Act of 1975
("Education Act" or "Act"), which the court upheld as facially valid.120

117. The literature on the New Jersey case is large and grows with each new supreme
LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: THE PoLmcs OF
Tractenberg, supra note 36; Paul L. Tractenberg, The
Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey Constitution of
1947 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibil
ity Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
179 (1996).
118. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
119. See Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)
("Robinson II); Robinson v. Cahill 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) ("Robinson III''); Robinson v.
Cahill 351 A2d 713 (NJ. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975) ("Robinson IV");
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) ("Robinson V"); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d
457 (NJ. 1976) ("Robinson VI"); Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) ("Robinson
court decision. See, e.g., RICHARD
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (1978);

,

,

VII").

120. See Robinson V, 355 A.2d at 139.
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But the Legislature subsequently failed to fund the Education Act, de
spite a court order (with a deadline) to do so.121 The court then
threatened to close the schools.122 Only after the court carried through
with its threat and closed the schools for eight days (albeit during the
summer), did the Legislature fund the Act - by passing a statewide
income tax.123 An order lifting the injunction that closed the schools
was the court's last act in the Robinson litigation.124
The Abbott litigation began in 1981. Students from four poor, .ur
ban minority districts - Camden, East Orange, Irvington, and Jersey
City - challenged the constitutionality of the Education Act as ap
plied, arguing that it did not sufficiently ameliorate the disparities be
tween poor and wealthy districts.125 After first remanding the case to
an Administrative Law Judge to develop a record, the supreme court
agreed with plaintiffs and held that the Act was unconstitutional as
applied not only to the four original districts, but also as applied to 24
other poor urban districts in the state.126 A thorough and efficient
education, the court held, is "that educational opportunity which is
needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a
citizen and as a competitor in the labor market," which means, the
court continued, "that poorer disadvantaged students must be given a
chance to be able to compete with relatively advantaged students."127
The Act did not ensure that opportunity, and the court ordered that
the Legislature provide substantial equality in funding between the 28
Abbott districts and the wealthiest suburban districts.128 The court also
ordered the state to devote additional funding to the Abbott districts
to support programs to address the "special educational needs of these
poorer urban districts."129
This time, and much to its later regret, the Legislature and Demo
cratic Governor Florio moved quickly and enacted the Quality Educa
tion Act ("QEA"). The QEA increased funding not only for poor ur
ban districts, but for the vast majority of school districts. The QEA
also required property-rich �chool districts to shoulder the burden of
121. See Robinson

VI, 358 A.2d at 457; see also Brown, supra note 117, at 191-92.

122 See Robinson

VI, 358 A.2d at 457; LEHNE, supra note 117, at 156-63.

123. See LEHNE, supra note 117, at 160-63.
124. See Robinson VII, 360 A.2d at 400.
125. See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 455 (N.J. 1998)
126.

("Abbott V").

See id.

127. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d 359, 372 (NJ. 1990) (citing Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273, 295
(N.J. 1973)).
128. See Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 408 ("We find that in order to provide a thorough and
efficient education in these poorer urban districts, the State must assure that their educa
tional expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent sub
urban districts. . . .").
129.

See id.
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teacher pension payments.130 Despite the wide dispersion of funds
that would have actually occurred under the QEA - school districts
enrolling 85% of the state's students would have benefited - public
opposition to the QEA was intense and widespread.131 Part of the op
position crune from the largest teachers' organization, which opposed
the handling of pension payments, and part came from a grassroots
anti-tax group. Another portion of the opposition, however, stemmed
from the (incorrect) public perception that the QEA would primarily
benefit poor, minority urban districts, an opposition that some com
mentators suggest "was fueled by the fact that minority children from
poorer urban districts were plaintiffs in the litigation."132
In response to the opposition, the Legislature quickly amended the
QEA. As a result, the poorest urban districts received only $287 mil
lion of the $800 million in new state aid distributed under the revised
QEA.133 Because the runended QEA left a large gap between the
Abbott districts and the wealthy suburban districts, plaintiffs returned
to court. In 1994, in Abbott III, the court found the statute unconstitu
tional as applied to the Abbott districts, both because it failed to assure
parity and because it failed to provide supplemental programs to assist
disadvantaged students.134 The court established yet another deadline
by which the Legislature had to assure parity of funding.135 And the
Legislature yet again ignored the deadline. When it finally did act in
December 1996, it enacted legislation that made no attempt to achieve
parity between the Abbott districts and the suburban districts; instead,
the legislation substantively defined a "thorough and efficient" educa
tion and, using figures generated from a hypothetical district and com
puter model, provided the funds allegedly necessary to support that
education.
In 1997, in Abbott IV, sixteen years after the start of the Abbott
litigation and twenty-seven years after the start of the Robinson litiga
tion, the court struck down the legislation and reinforced its earlier

130. See Brown, supra note 117, at 196.
131. See, e.g., id. at 197; Reed, supra note 3, at 209; Douglas S. Reed, The People v. The
Court: School Finance Refonn and the New Jersey Supreme Court, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 137 (1994).
132. Brown, supra note 117, at 196-97; see also MARGARET E. GOER1Z, THE ROCKY
ROAD TO SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 2 (Center for Educ. Pol'y Analysis Jan. 1993). As
Douglas Reed has explained, "Governor Jim Florio designed the QEA (along with property
tax rebates) to aid a broad range of lower-class and middle-class districts. The problem was
that no one believed him." Reed, supra note 3, at 209. Thus, "[d]espite the pledges that
middle and lower class districts would benefit under the new school finance regime - and
budget allocations that fulfilled those pledges - middle class New Jerseyans quite literally
took to the streets (and to the talk radio airwaves) to voice their opposition." Id.

133. See Brown, supra note 117, at 197-98.
134. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A2d 575 (NJ. 1994) ("Abbott Ill").
135. See id.
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order requiring parity.136 A year later, in Abbott V, the court - in its
twelfth and most recent school finance decision - approved various
additional programs for the Abbott districts.137 At the moment, the
Legislature appears to be complying with the court's latest orders to
achieve parity and to fund additional programs. But given the Legisla
ture's intense opposition throughout this saga, it is likely that the cur
rent repose is only temporary. Indeed, there is evidence that the Leg
islature is continuing to explore alternatives to parity in an effort to
get out from under the court's remedy.138
The Texas school finance saga has been less protracted than New
Jersey's, but it still has been a long and complicated battle.139 The
Texas Supreme Court first struck down Texas's financing scheme in
1989, on the ground that the funding disparities created and tolerated
by the scheme were not "efficient" as required by the state constitu
tion.140 The Legislature responded the next year by enacting legisla
tion that the supreme court struck down in 1991 as insufficient; the
court criticized the legislation for failing to "restructure the [financing]
system."141 Then the litigation took an odd tum. The Legislature en
acted legislation creating 188 county education districts ("CEDs"),
solely for tax purposes; the idea was to group property-rich and prop
erty-poor districts together and have the former support the latter.
Despite the fact that the Legislature certainly restructured the finance
system, the supreme court struck this new scheme down on the ground
that it created an unconstitutional ad valorem tax.142
The Legislature then proposed a constitutional amendment that
would allow for the creation of CEDs to levy, collect, and distribute
the taxes.143 Opponents dubbed the financing scheme and the neces
sary amendment the "Robin Hood" plan, because it involved recap
turing money from the wealthier districts and redistributing it to the

136. See Abbott W, 693 A.2d 417 (NJ. 1997).
137. See Abbott V, 710 A.2d 450 (NJ. 1998).
138. See, e.g., David P. Rebovich, School Tab Threatens Whitman's Blueprint, 7 N.J.
LAW. 211 (1998); Author's Interviews with David Sciarra, Legal Director, Education Law
Center, Newark, NJ (counsel for Abbott plaintiffs) (Feb. 3 & 10, 1998).
139. See Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991) (remarking, in the context of discussing the Texas cases,
that school finance reform "is like a Russian novel: it's long, tedious, and everybody dies in
the end").
140. See Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
141. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex. 1991) ("Edgewood
II").
142 See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex. 1992) ("Edgewood III").
143. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 460 (Tex. 1995)
("Edgewood V").

Michigan Law Review

462

[Vol. 98:432

poorer ones.144 Voters in tum rejected the constitutional amendment
by a wide margin
63 percent to 27 percent.145 The state then en
acted legislation that capped property values at $280,000 per pupil.
Districts with property wealth above that amount must choose one or
a combination of the following options: consolidate (physically or fi
-

nancially) with another district, detach territory for tax purposes, write
the state a check, or educate nonresident students.146 The financing
scheme itself is two-tiered, with a foundation grant (tier one) that
guarantees a set amount per pupil at a given tax rate, and a guaran
teed yield plan (tier two) that guarantees an additional amount of
funding per pupil for every additional cent in taxes above the mini
mum required for the foundation grant.147
In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court upheld this legislation against
challenges brought by property-poor districts (who objected to the fact
that the legislation does not eliminate all disparities), as well as those
brought by property-rich districts (who objected to the cap on prop
erty values).148 Although this plan has existed for three years, its long
term stability is questionable. The Legislature debated competing
proposals in 1997 either to eliminate the funding formula altogether or
to raise the cap on assessed values, in order to reduce the "Robin
Hood" effect of the current system.149 The issue will be revisited in
1999, when the biennial legislature next convenes.150
The litigation in Arizona is in its infancy by comparison to that in
New Jersey and Texas, but it is already beginning to resemble its more
mature companions. The plaintiff districts in Arizona are predomi
nantly Hispanic, and in 1994, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated
the state's system of funding school facilities.151 The court found that
this aspect of the state's finance scheme, which relies primarily on lo
cal property taxes, caused "gross disparities" and created "inadequate
educational opportunities."152 The Legislature's first two responses
were declared insufficient by the supreme court.153 In a move reminis
cent of the New Jersey litigation, the supreme court then threatened

144. See Douglas S. Reed, Court-Ordered School Finance Equalization: Judicial Activ
ism and Democratic Opposition 10 (National Ctr. for Educ. Statistics Rep. 97-535) (last
modified July 23, 1997) <http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97535g.html>.
145. See id.
146. See Edgewood V, 893 S.W.2d at 461.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 468-84.
149. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 250.
150. See id.
151. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
152 Id. at 814.
153. See Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997).
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to cut off all public school funding if the Legislature did not enact re
sponsive legislation.154
The Legislature responded to the threat and enacted a plan that
requires the state to spend $374 million annually to build, equip, and
maintain public schools.155 Localities will still be able to spend above
the state grant amounts through voter-approved local tax increases.
The plan also requires the state to set adequacy standards for the fa
cilities and to ensure that all public schools meet those standards
within five years.156 The plan, on its face, satisfied plaintiffs, who
joined the state in requesting the Arizona court to declare the plan
constitutional.157 Plaintiffs did not wish the court to close the case and
terminate jurisdiction, however, given that the standards have not yet
been developed.158 In mid-July, the supreme court approved the plan
as constitutional and went ahead and terminated the case.159 Whether
this plan will succeed in closing the gap in facilities funding will not be
known for another year or two, and plaintiffs have suggested that they
will consider filing another suit if the gap is not eliminated.160
B.

When White or Integrated Districts Win in Court

Legislative recalcitrance and public opposition, to be sure, are not
exclusive to states where minority districts succeed in court.161 A cur
rent example of legislative wrangling following court success by white
school districts is found in New Hampshire, where the state supreme
court, in December 1997, struck down the state's school finance sys
tem.162 That system relied to a larger extent than any other in the
country on local funding, with the state share of school funding less

154.

See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 102.

155. See Hal Mattern, Court 0Ks Students First, Closes Case, THE ARlzONA REPUBLIC,
July 21, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Mattern, Court OKs Students First]; Hal Mattern, School
Aid Partisans End Battle; Both Sides Petition Court for OK of Law, THE ARlzONA
REPUBLIC, July 16, 1998, at Bl [hereinafter Mattern, School-Aid Partisans].
156.

See Mattern, School-Aid Partisans, supra note 155, at Bl.

157.

See id.

158.

See id.

159.

See Mattern, Court OKs Students First, supra note 155, at Al.

160. See id. (quoting the superintendent of one of the plaintiff districts, Jose Lebya, who
stated: "I'd hate to see us' back in court in two years, but if the gap isn't closed, as plaintiffs
we would have to evaluate whether to file another suit").
161. See, e.g., Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equality in Education: Deconstructing the
Reigning Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 691, 693 (1993)
(suggesting that "few of the plaintiff victories have resulted in reforms that have demonstra
bly ameliorated the inequities," and that "overall, the record is disappointing").
162

See Oaremont Sch. Dist v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.H. 1997).
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than 10 % .163 In Claremont School District v. Governor, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that students have a fundamental
right to an adequate education and agreed with plaintiffs - five white
rural districts - that property tax rates used to generate revenue for
schools must be imposed uniformly across the state.164
The Legislature and the Governor worked on responses for six
months following the decision. Two proposals - one from the Gov
ernor and another from a state Senator - were declared insufficient
·by the supreme court, largely because both called for continued reli
ance upon varying real estate tax rates.165 The Legislature recessed in
the summer of 1998 without having agreed to a plan.166 During the
summer, Senator James M. Rubens, a Republican candidate for gov
ernor, tried to gamer support for a constitutional amendment that
would effectively overrule the supreme court's decision.167 And then,
finally, on April 29, 1999, the Legislature passed a bill that relied on a
statewide property tax to raise the revenues necessary to satisfy the
court's ruling.168
An older example of public opposition to a school funding decision
comes from California, although the interpretation of events there is
not free from uncertainty. In California, shortly after the supreme
court ruled in the Serrano litigation that spending disparities among
districts could not exceed $ 100, the voters approved Proposition 13.169
This constitutional amendment capped local property taxes at one
percent, rolled back property assessments, and required future state
tax increases to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature.170
In a well known article, and a subsequent follow-up, William Fischel
argued that the tax revolt was caused by the equalization decisions;
according to Fischel, the equalized financing took away any incentive

163. See Linda Jacobson, School Finance Ruling Raises New Tax Questions in N.H.,

EDUC. WK., Jan. 14, 1998, at 26.

164. See Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1357-58.
165. See Linda Jacobson, N.H. Lawmakers Go Home With No Funding Plan, EDUC.
WK., July 8, 1998, at 20, 24.
166. See id. at 20.
167. See id. at 24.
168. See Mary Ann Zohr, At Long Last, N.H. Passes School Finance Plan, EDUC. WK
ON 1HE WEB (May 5, 1999) <http://www.edweek.org/cw/1994/34nn.nl8>. Although New
Hampshire does demonstrate that school finance decisions in favor of white districts will cer
tainly cause controversy in some states, it is nonetheless important to recognize that New
Hampshire is relatively new to the school finance game. In Claremont, the court allowed the
continuing funding system to remain in place until the end of 1998, recognizing that the
Legislature would need a reasonable amount of time to change the system. Although the
Legislature exceeded this time limit, and took close to a year and a half to enact responsive
legislation, by New Jersey standards the Legislature acted quite quickly.
169. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-8.
170. See CAL. CONST. art. XllIA, §§ 1, 3 (1978).
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among property-rich districts to continue trucing themselves at high
rates because local districts would have to forfeit some local revenue
to the state.171 Others have disagreed with Fischel's hypothesis, argu
ing that Proposition 13 was caused by a more generalized opposition
to high property taxes.172
Whatever its original cause, however, Proposition 13 has been
devastating for the financing of California public schools, causing
overall spending to plummet and California to drop from near the top
in the nation in per-pupil expenditures to thirty-fifth.173 At the same
time, disparities among districts, although originally reduced by the
Serrano litigation, have grown in recent years. The increasing dispari
ties are due in part to student activities fees, desegregation funding,
developer fees, private grants, and other means of raising revenue that
are not covered by Proposition 13 or Serrano.114
It is thus true, as New Hampshire and California illustrate, that
school finance decisions won by white districts have not been met with
enthusiasm in every state. At the same time, however, recalcitrant
states like New Hampshire and California appear to be outweighed
(and are certainly outnumbered) by those where the legislatures have
been quite responsive to court mandates. This latter group includes
Kentucky, Tennessee, Vermont, Massachusetts, Washington, and ar
guably Montana.175 I will discuss each of these states briefly and in
turn, beginning with the poster child of this group, Kentucky.

171. See Fischel, How Serrano, supra note 1, at 609 ("My research through scholarly
articles, California newspapers and public documents shows that Serrano forced a legislature
that was apparently eager to help poorer schools to adopt a particular response that was so
far from California voters' demand for education that they brought Proposition 13 down on
themselves." (footnote omitted)).
172. See, e.g., REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-8 n.22 (quoting one of plaintiffs ' at
torneys in Serrano, who dismissed Fischel's argument as "silly" and suggested that the tax
revolt resulting in Proposition 13 was a "force unto its own").
173.

See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 111.

174. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-10. An unusual source of additional reve
nue exists in Beverly Hills; according to Fischel, the Beverly Hills school district "owns oil
wells, whose revenues were not considered taxes and thus are not subject to either Serrano's
or Proposition 13's constraints." Fischel, How Serrano, supra note 1, at 621. For discussion
and evidence of California's school finance experience after Proposition 13, see, e.g., Bradley
W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis of Litigation
Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 792-97, 813-14 (1995) (ar
guing that school finance litigation was a "Pyrrhic" victory in California because funding for
the poorest school districts increased at half the rate of the national average in the years af
ter the Serrano litigation); Tractenberg, supra note 36, at 72-75, 111-20.
175. Montana is representative of a small group of states, including West Virginia and
Arkansas, where the legislatures were initially fairly responsive, but changes in the state
economy combined with lack of continuing pressure for reform have stymied efforts to alle
viate disparities or increase funding. See, e.g., REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-4, A-44 to
A-47, A-82 to A-87; see also Martin Schoppmeyer & Tommy Venters, Arkansas' Disap
pearing Tax Base (March 1993) (paper delivered at the American Ed. Finance Ass'n meet
ing) (on file with author); J.L. Flanigan, West Virginia's Financial Dilemma: The Ideal
School System in the Real World, 15 J. EDUC. FIN. 229 (1989); Quality Counts, supra note 21,
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In 1989, in response to a suit filed by predominantly white rural
districts, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared the state's entire sys
tem of education (including its financing) unconstitutional.176 Less
than a year later, the Legislature enacted a sweeping and thorough re
form package. The legislative package, known as the Kentucky Edu
cation Reform Act ("KERA"), both increased expenditures overall
and reduced spending disparities.177 In only three years, state funding
increased by $540.7 million, a 34% raise that boosted average per
pupil expenditures by over $1,000.178 During the same time period, the
range between high- and low-spending districts dropped by 27%.179
KERA, which has been hailed as "the nation's most comprehensive
experiment in educational reform," also contained innovative provi
sions regarding school governance and accountability, created sup
plemental programs for at-risk children, and established academic
standards.180
Similarly responsive, if not as far-reaching, were legislative changes
in both Tennessee and Vermont. A group of mostly rural, predomi
nantly white school districts filed suit in Tennessee, alleging that ex
isting funding disparities were unconstitutional.181 Interestingly, a
group of metropolitan and urban districts, including Nashville
Davidson County and Memphis, intervened to contest the suit and ex
press their opposition to having money diverted away from urban ar
eas toward the rural districts.182 Plaintiffs won,183 but even prior to the
at 265 (reporting that state court judge in West Virginia recently ordered Legislature again
to equalize funding between poor and well-to-do school districts).
176. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). Sixty-six
poor school districts formed the Council for Better Education, and they were joined by
seven other districts. Not among the plaintiffs was Louisville-Jefferson County. See Charles
J. Russo, School-Based Decision Making in Kentucky: Dawn ofa New Era or Nothing New
Under the Sun?, 83 KY. LJ. 123, 123 (1995). Surprisingly, no school district in Kentucky has
a majority black enrollment. See id. For an entertaining discussion of the litigation (and
Kentucky history), see Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School
Reform Law, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367 (1991). Combs, the former Governor of Kentucky,
served as lead attorney for plaintiffs in the case.
177. For a useful discussion of the provisions and implementation of KERA, see Jacob
E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Policy & Students' Opportunities to Learn: Kentucky's Expe·
rience, THE FuTuRE OF CmLDREN, Winter 1997, at 79.
178.

See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-33 to A-34; Adams, supra note 177, at 81·

84.
179.

See Adams, supra note 177, at 81-84.

180.

See id. at 79-80.

181.

See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).

182 See Ernest G. Kelly, Jr., School Finance Litigation: An Urban Perspective, 61
TENN. L. REV. 471 (1994). For insight into the rural schools' perspective and the state's per·
spective on the case, see, respectively, Donelson, supra note 84, and Charles W. Burson &
Jane W. Young, School Finance Litigation: The State's Perspective, 61 TENN. L. REV. 457
(1994).
183.

See McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 141.
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supreme court decision in 1993, the Legislature revised Tennessee's
school finance system.184 The new formula targeted more money to
the rural areas but required a six-year phase-in period and initially left
out teachers' salaries as a cost that would be equalized.185 The school
districts returned to court to challenge the new law, and in 1995, the
Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the phase-in period was accept
able but that teachers' salaries had to be included within the equaliza
tion plan.186 During the last six years, rural areas have received a
greater proportion of state increases in funding, which has served to
close the gap in spending between rural and suburban and metropoli
tan districts. All school districts, however, have seen some increase in
state aid.187 Indeed, over the six-year period that the new funding
formula has been phased in, state spending on education has increased
by $1 billion - an 80% increase since 1992.188 The Legislature,
moreover, does not appear anxious to alter the revised system, which
seems to be satisfying both rural and urban districts alike.189
In Vermont, the Legislature reacted with remarkable alacrity to a
state supreme court ruling in February 1997, which held that the dis
parities created by the state's reliance on local property taxes deprived
children of their constitutional right to equal educational opportuni
ties.190 Within four months of the ruling, the Vermont Legislature en
acted a bill that created a new statewide property tax earmarked for
schools, and it also provided a funding mechanism that requires
property-wealthy districts to share locally generated funds with other

184. See Linda G. Morra, School Finance: Three States' Experience with Equity in
School Funding, GAO REP. HEHS-96-39, at 37 (Dec. 19, 1995). At the time that the Legis
lature acted, a lower state court had already declared the Tennessee finance system uncon
stitutional. The GAO Report suggests that the Legislature was motivated to act "by a po
tential court-imposed solution."
Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court in its decision
acknowledged the passage of the new legislation, but did not rule upon it and instead de
voted its decision to the system that existed
, prior to its passage. See McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
at 147.
185.

See Morra, supra note 184, at 40-46.

186.

See id. at 45-46.

187. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 247 (reporting that a member of the state sen
ate education committee acknowledged that the new aid targets the rural districts that
brought the equalization suit, but also pointed out that all districts have seen their budgets
increase).
188.

See id.

189. See Morra, supra note 184, at 86 (reporting that "[n]early all the officials we inter
viewed [which included a small district superintendent] indicated that the impact of new
money on small, rural districts had been significant," allowing these districts to "provide
educational opportunities to their students that they could not offer before"); Quality
Counts, supra note 21, at 244 {"While urban school officials say they wouldn't mind more
money and less regulation, most are generally satisfied with how the state treats them.").
190.

See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1994).
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districts.191 Under the plan, the State will ensure that each student re
ceives a little more than $5,000 in funding at a set tax rate. Localities
can tax above the set rate and spend more than $5,000, but wealthier
districts will have to share additional tax revenues. Thus, under the
plan, forty-one "gold towns," many near ski resorts, will have to share
tax revenues with 211 "receiving" towns. The Governor's press secre
tary boasted that "no state has taken such broad steps in such a short
amount of time as Vermont," a claim that appears accurate.192 Despite
the quick response, the legislation is still the subject of ongoing con
troversy and debate, with the wealthier towns objecting to what they
call a Robin Hood approach.193 Even novelist John Irving, who lives in
a town that would lose money under the new plan, has entered the
fray, calling the state's plan Marxist and vowing either to open his own
private school or leave the state.194 At the moment, however, the plan
is in place and functioning.
In Massachusetts and Washington, the legislatures were similarly
quite eager to reform their state's education finance system. The Mas
sachusetts litigation, as mentioned above, was brought by sixteen
school districts - thirteen of which were predominantly white, and
three of which were predominantly Hispanic.195 According to one of
the attorneys who worked on the case, Boston was intentionally left
out as a plaintiff, both because of the high spending in the district and
because the attorneys believed it would have injected racial issues into
the case, which would have been "too distracting."196 When the
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the state's financing scheme
violated the government's duty to "cherish" the schools and failed to

191. See, e.g., Joetta L. Stack, Vt. Lawmakers Include New State Property Tax in Finance
Plan, EDUC WK., June 25, 1997.
192

See id.

193. For an interesting story on the political dispute, see generally Elinor Burkett, Don't
Tread on My Tax Rate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998 (Magazine), at 42. For an entertaining, if
slightly inaccurate polemic against the legislation, see Amity Shlaes, Vermont Levels Its
Schools, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1998, at A22.
194.

The

See Shlaes, supra note 193, at A22; Joetta Sack & Robert C. Johnson, State Journal,
Author and Act 60, EDUC. WK. ON TIIE WEB (June 24, 1998)

<http://www.edweek.org/ew/1998/4/stjour.h17>.
195.

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

196. Telephone Interview with Mark D. Weisman, Esq. (counsel for plaintiffs) (Feb. 13,
1998). Massachusetts is classified with the "white" districts, despite the inclusion of three
predominantly Hispanic districts as plaintiffs, for three reasons. First, the vast maj ority (13
of 16) plaintiff districts were predominantly white. Second, Massachusetts has traditionally
had difficult relations between blacks and whites, as Boston's desegregation experience pain
fully demonstrated, see, e.g., J. ANTiiONY LUKAS, COMMON GROUND (1985); I am not
aware of comparable difficulties between whites and Hispanics. Third, there is no indication
that race or ethnicity was a factor in the litigation or legislation. Indeed, according to Mark
Weisman, supra, plaintiffs' attorneys intentionally structured their case to avoid injecting
racial issues into the case.
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assure an adequate education for all students,197 legislation to reform
the system was already sitting on the Governor's desk awaiting his sig
nature.198 Since enacted, that legislation has increased state education
aid by over $200 million a year for each of the last five years, raising
the per-pupil spending in the poorest quartile of districts by 27% .199
And the state's target of bringing all poor districts up to a "founda
tion" level based on student population and need by the year 2000
seems within reach.200
Washington is difficult to classify as a true success story, and it is
perhaps best described as an example of the unintended consequences
that can attend school finance litigation. The Washington experience
is nonetheless quite consistent with the thesis of this Article, insofar as
the Legislature acted quickly in response to litigation brought by an
integrated urban district, but enacted legislation that ultimately
worked to the disadvantage of high minority districts. The case was
brought by the Seattle school district, which is composed of a diverse
mix of students. As of 1993-94, 41 % of students were white, 25%
Asian-American, 23% African-American, 8% Hispanic, and 3% Na
tive American.201 After the trial court declared the state's financing
system unconstitutional in 1976, but before the supreme court af
firmed that ruling, the state government enacted legislation that de
fined the state's educational goals, placed a greater burden for funding
on the state, and limited the amount that localities could spend be
yond the state-provided amount.202 According to one commentator,
the state government was clearly anxious to reform the finance system,
describing the Legislature at the time as a "consensus looking for a
solution," and contending that the judicial decision merely "added
momentum" to the Legislature's reform plans.203
Despite an early increase in state aid, however, in the two decades
since the decision Washington's education spending has declined rela
tive to other states.204 More importantly, while greater equalization
197.
1993).

See McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.

198.

See Enrich, supra note 60, at 176.

199.

See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 175.

200.

See id.; see also Oare Kittredge, They Say Others' Examples Leave Room for a So
lution Here, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1998 (New Hampshire Weekly), at 1 (describing leg
islative responses to school finance decisions in Massachusetts and other states).
201.

Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 262.

202

See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-74 to A-77.

203. See ROBERT PALAICH ET AL., STATE LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND LEADERSHIP:
THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF SCHOOL FINANCE 233-34 (Education Governance Center
Working Paper No. 1, 1983).
204. Washington's average per-pupil expenditures dropped from 12th in 1979 to 25th in
1991. See Jim Simon, The State Budget: Battle ofthe Bulge - Crowded Classrooms Equal a
Financial Squeeze, SEATTLE T!MES, Mar. 22, 1993, at Al.
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has occurred, most of the benefit has gone to rural districts.205 Ac
cording to some accounts, the urban districts' greater needs for special
education, bilingual education, and capital repairs have largely gone
unmet and in fact have been hampered by the spending caps.206 In
deed, one study indicated that the legislation has reduced the share of
education funds going to the districts with the highest percentage of
poor and minority students.207
Rounding out the picture of legislative responses where successful
suits were brought by white or integrated districts is Montana, which
actually serves as a prototype for two other states, West Virginia and
Arkansas. Sixty-seven predominantly white school districts,203 includ
ing Helena and Billings, challenged Montana's finance system in
1987.209 Relying on an explicit constitutional guarantee of equal edu
cational opportunity, the supreme court upheld their challenge in
1989.210 That same year, the Legislature enacted a "sweeping overhaul
of the entire system," which included the largest single increase in
education funding in Montana history.211 The legislation still allowed
for significant disparities, however, which were addressed after plain
tiffs filed another case and a coalition of rural districts initiated their
own litigation.212 Although the new legislation did result in greater
equalization, with rural schools receiving additional funding, it also cut
funding for the schools by $29 million because of a state recession.213
The two additional lawsuits were dismissed after the latest legislative
changes, but the state trial court has retained jurisdiction to allow the
parties to amend their pleadings to challenge the new legislation.214

205.

See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-78 to A-79.

206.

See, e.g., id. at A-79.

207. See Neil D. Theobald & Faith Hanna, Ample Provision for Whom?: The Evolution
ofState Control over School Finance in Washington, 17 J. EDUC. FIN. 7 (1991). As Theobold
and Hanna explain, prior to the equalization litigation, teachers' salaries in poor minority
districts were about 2% above the state average. Since salaries have been equalized, the
poor minority schools have received less money for their teachers. See id. at 24-25.
208. Whites comprise 92% of the entire state's population; the only sizable minority
group consists of Native Americans, who make up 6% of the population and 10% of the K12 student body. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 194.
209.

See Helena Sch. Dist v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).

210.

See id. at 690.

211. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-44; THE JOINT INTERIM SUBCOMMITTEE
ON SCHOOL FuNDING, 53D LEGIS., REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE REsPONSES TO REMAINING
SCHOOL FuNDING EQUITY ISSUES (Mont. 1992) (prepared by Andrea L. Merrill).
212 See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-45 to A-46; David Fenner, Lawsuit Re
vised: Schools Challenge Funding Fix, THE MISSOURIAN, Aug. 20, 1993.
213. See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-47; cf. Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 194
(reporting that the Legislature cut $50 million from the education budget).
214.

See REBELL ET AL., supra note 45, at A-47 to A-48.
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Montana's example, like Washington's, is difficult to classify and
provides further proof of the complexity of school finance reform.
The Montana Legislature was prodded first by a court decision and
then by the threat of additional litigation to make an apparently sin
cere and good-faith effort to reform the school finance system. The
state's poor economy, however, ultimately dwarfed the legislative re
forms. A similar dynamic has occurred in West Virginia and Arkan
sas, where the legislatures made attempts to equalize school spending
in response to a court decision (and in West Virginia largely suc
ceeded), but where the poor economies have kept overall spending
quite low.215 Although one could not call the school finance litigation
in these states a complete success by any stretch, the failures do not
seem directly attributable to legislative inaction or opposition to
school finance reform.
C.

Assessing the Evidence

This leads to the point one can reasonably make regarding the leg
islative responses in the states just surveyed. It is not true that court
success by a white or integrated district will always translate into leg
islation that equalizes and increases expenditures. But the efforts
made in these states, and the success stories of states like Kentucky,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Massachusetts, stand in contrast to the tenor
of the legislative and popular responses to court decisions in states like
New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona. The level and quality of legislative
recalcitrance and public opposition is palpably different in the latter
states. The New Jersey Supreme Court has had to rule twelve times in
order to force the Legislature to comply, the Texas Supreme Court
five, and the Arizona Supreme Court four times. In two of these
states, the courts have had to threaten to close the schools to prompt
legislative action. And in each of these states, the legislature and/or
the public has openly and often fiercely opposed devoting more re
sources to districts attended primarily by minority students.216
The upshot of the evidence may be that school finance reform is
typically a difficult and complicated process and that translating a
court decision into significant equalization or increased resources will

215. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 104-06, 265.
216. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 102, 204-05, 252. According to a teacher from
Phoenix, a predominantly Hispanic district, "[a] lot of the attitude is, 'It's a rat hole, so why
pour more money down it.' Id. at 100. In a report regarding education reform in Texas,
Dallas was described as a scene of "bitter and open racial feuding" among blacks, whites,
and Hispanics. Id. at 252. The same report quoted the Superintendent of Houston, who ob
served that it is difficult to garner public support for education in city schools because "[t]he
district educates a student population that does not resemble the adult makeup of the city
taxpayers in ethnicity or socioeconomic levels." Id. at 252. And in New Jersey, legislators
have generally demonstrated a stronger interest in taking over urban minority districts than
in complying with court orders to increase expenditures in those districts. See id. at 204-05.
"
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usually be a challenge. But the experiences in Texas, New Jersey, and
Arizona suggest that reform will be particularly difficult when legisla
tures are forced by court order to devote more resources primarily to
minority districts. Thus, while a number of white districts may, like
minority districts, also fail to capitalize on school finance court victo
ries, that fact alone hardly makes school finance litigation a promising
avenue for minority districts.
One final note on the evidence is in order, concerning the actual
results of the cases in New Jersey and Texas. (Arizona is excluded be
cause the Legislature only recently enacted valid legislation). In both
cases, spending disparities have been reduced, and in New Jersey, the
twenty-eight urban minority districts are currently funded at the same
level as the wealthiest suburban districts - and this in the state that
has the highest average per-pupil expenditure. The results are impor
tant, and they clearly run counter - at least at first glance - to my
argument that urban minority districts do not fare particularly well in
school finance reform. But there are three points to keep in mind
when assessing these results, all of which help place the results in per
spective and reduce, if not eliminate, their apparent inconsistency with
my thesis.
First, New Jersey and Texas are clearly exceptional cases, insofar
as they are only two of ten states where minority districts have
brought school finance challenges. In seven other states, the challenge
never made it past the court, and in the eighth - Arizona - the re
sults are not complete. Second, the results were not achieved \vithout
extraordinarily long legislative fights and would not have been real
ized without strong judicial leadership. There are already signs in
both New Jersey and Texas suggesting that judicial involvement may
not be as strong or favorable in the future.217 Third, and relatedly,
there is no evidence that the saga will end soon in either state, as there
is little sense that the legislatures are truly dedicated to implementing
the court-ordered reform. On the contrary, in both New Jersey and
Texas, there are signs of unrest and indications that the legislatures
will revisit the issue soon. Although it is too early to predict the next
stage in the New Jersey and Texas stories, the sense one has of the
current situation in these states is quite different from the sense one
has of the legislatures' dedication to school finance reform in states
like Kentucky and Tennessee, where the court decisions were readily
accepted and the remedies are being carried out apparently quite
faithfully.

217. Chief Justice Wilentz, for example, who spearheaded the earlier Abbott decisions,
has been replaced by Deborah Poritz, who formerly was Governor Whitman's Attorney
General. In Texas, there was some backtracking in Edgewood III and W, and there is con·
tinuing evidence of popular discontent with the funding scheme. See YUDOF ET AL., supra
note 36, at 648; Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 250.
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Race as an Explanation

Although the above evidence suggests that minority districts have
faced a greater degree of legislative recalcitrance after winning in
court, it does not necessarily follow that these districts suffered be
cause oftheir racial composition. And it is certainly true that alterna
tive explanations that do not rely on race could plausibly explain the
legislative reactions in Arizona, New Jersey, and Texas. There are, af
ter all, a number of factors not directly related to race that influence
legislative attempts to reform school financing -- anti-tax sentiment
within the state, general urban/suburban/rural power struggles, and
the state's economy all play a role. Without discounting those factors,
I would like to discuss in more detail the evidence gathered by Tedin
and Reed, mentioned at the outset of the Article, which lends more
direct support to the hypothesis that race does play a role in popular
(and by presumption legislative) opposition to the equalization of re
sources.218
Tedin surveyed roughly 1,000 whites in two predominantly white
districts near Houston, one of which would gain funds under a legisla
tive plan then being considered and one of which would lose funds.219
He gauged their attitudes both toward school finance reform and to
ward blacks and Hispanics. He found first that 82% of whites as
sumed that school finance equalization would benefit predominantly
Hispanic districts, and 83 % believed it would also benefit predomi
nantly black districts. Only 9 % of whites surveyed thought white dis
tricts would benefit, and 73% thought white districts would lose
money.220 This perception was incorrect in two ways: first, some white
districts, including one of the two districts in which the respondents
lived, would benefit under the plan, and, second, most blacks in Texas
live in urban areas like Houston or Dallas, which happen to be
property-rich and not likely to be helped by school finance reform.221
Tedin then found that hostility or prejudice toward blacks, using
measurements developed for gauging "symbolic" or "modem" ra
cism,222 had almost the same correlation with attitudes toward school
218.

See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.

219. The polling occurred in August 1991. At the time, the Texas Legislature had re
cently enacted a plan that created 188 county educational districts ("CEDs"), which grouped
together a number of school districts for financing purposes only. The CEDs had roughly
equal property valuations, and within a CED, funds were designed to flow from wealthier
school districts to poorer ones. See Tedin, supra note 3, at 630.
220.

See Tedin, supra note 3, at 634 n.18.

221.

See id. at 639 n.27.

222. The idea of symbolic or modem racism stems most directly from David Sears's
work on whites' attitudes toward busing. Sears posits that symbolic racism has replaced
much overt racism, and that the former arises out of a general hostility toward black de
mands for greater inclusion in the economic and political benefits of society, as well as from
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finance equalization as did economic self-interest. In other words,
Tedin found that a measurement indicating prejudice or hostility to
ward blacks was just about as likely to be correlated with opposition to
school finance equalization as was living in the district that stood to
lose funds.223
Reed's research, in turn, involved studying the results of a June
1990 poll of 800 New Jersey residents about their views regarding the
recently enacted QEA. He found that, for the population at large,
economic self-interest (i.e., would the respondent's property taxes rise
or fall, or would respondent's school district receive more or less state
aid) seemed to have the greatest influence on attitudes toward the
QEA.224 Among parents of school children, however, he found that
the QEA was viewed largely "through racial lenses," and that neither
the perceived effects of the QEA nor the parents' income could ex
plain attitudes toward the QEA.225 "Instead, race was a far better pre
dictor of support or opposition. In general, white parents were far
more likely to oppose the QEA and nonwhite parents were far more
likely to support equalization, all other variables held constant."226 In
deed, even white parents within the 28 Abbott districts strongly op
posed the QEA, despite the fact that their schools would receive addi
tional funding.227
The analyses and methodologies of Tedin and Reed assuredly
could be criticized, as seemingly all social science studies eventually
are, and their inquiries and sample groups are fairly limited. But
theirs are the only studies I have found, aside from the research on

the perception that blacks lack commitment to traditional values such as individualism, dis
cipline, and self-reliance. See David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM:
PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988); David 0.
Sears & H.M Allen, The Trajectory of Local Desegregation Controversies and Whites' Op·
position to Busing, in GROUPS IN CONFLICT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 123,
133 (Norman Miller & Marilynn B. Brewster eds., 1984). Tedin posed four questions that
have been used in the past to measure symbolic racism, such as whether respondents agreed
or disagreed with th� statement that "[i]t's really a matter of some people not trying hard
enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." Tedin, su
pra note 3, at 635 & n.22. He then compared scores on this measurement with attitudes to·
ward school finance reform. Needless to say, the entire concept of "symbolic racism" is con·
troversial, as are the means of measuring it. See, e.g., Paul M. Sniderman & Philip E.
Tetlock, Symbolic Racism: Problems of Political Motive Attribution, 42 AM. J. Soc. ISSUES
129 (1986). To my untrained eye, the controversy seems well deserved, insofar as using four
questions to determine if the respondent deserves to be deemed a racist - albeit a symbolic
or modem one - appears a bit less than scientific. Nonetheless, the fact that a high score on
the symbolic racism test explained nearly as much opposition to school equalization as did
measurements of economic self-interest is not easily ignored.
223.

See Tedin, supra note 3, at 638, 646-47.

224.

See Reed, supra note 3, at 211.

225.

See id. at 212.

226.

Id.

227.

See id. at 211-12; see also Reed, supra note 144, at 9.
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Proposition 13 in California, seeking to explain popular support for or
opposition to school finance reform, and they certainly support the no
tion that school finance reform is a racially divisive issue - even
among whites and blacks who both stand to gain from the reform. In
deed, their research goes beyond my argument - that minority dis
tricts which will benefit from school finance decisions face an uphill
legislative battle - and suggests that whites tend to perceive school
finance reform as primarily benefiting minorities, even when inconsis
tent with reality, and that "racial hostility" appears to play a "major
role in explaining the level of support for the reform of school financ
ing."228
That minority districts will have a difficult time securing legislative
reform, even when successful in court, is also suggested by commenta
tors who have asserted that school finance court decisions will lead to
legislative reform only when those decisions coincide with an existing
political consensus in favor of reform. Under such circumstances,
these commentators suggest, court decisions can act as a prod or shield
for legislators who favor reform but have not acted because of fear of
voter reaction - e.g., voter backlash over increased taxes.229 The leg
islative successes in Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Washington bear
out this observation; in each state, the legislature was poised to act
even before the court decisions.230
To the extent that this political dynamic is an accurate predictor of
legislative responsiveness, it is not surprising that the legislatures in
New Jersey, Texas, and Arizona have been less than anxious to divert

228. Tedin, supra note 3, at 638.
229. See, e.g., ELMORE & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 90; Enrich, supra note 60, at 17677; Clayton P. Gillette, Reconstructing Local Control of School Finance, 25 CAP. U. L. REv.
37 {1996); Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses and Statehouses: Educational Finance,
Constitutional Structure, and the Separation ofPowers Doctrine, 33 LAND & WA1ER L. REv.
281, 305-06 (1998); Kahn, supra note 114, at 468 ("Successful [school finance] litigation has
more often been the product, not the cause, of a political consensus that the schools need
fundamental change.").
230. See Enrich, supra note 60, at 176-77. Enrich observes that in Kentucky, Massachu
setts, and Washington, at the time their state supreme courts ruled, the legislatures had al
ready "taken significant steps to transform the educational system challenged in the case."
Id. at 176. The courts in these states, Enrich argues, thus served "as a goad or as a backstop
to the legislature's accomplishment" Id. (footnote omitted).
Similarly, in other states, legislatures have acted in response to litigation that ultimately
resulted in the state financing scheme being upheld. Minnesota, for example, reformed its
school finance system while litigation (brought by rural districts) was pending. See Morra,
supra note 184, at 48. Notably, similar legislative action did not occur in the states where
litigation was brought by minority districts - e.g., New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, or
Michigan. Decades after unsuccessful school finance litigation, Michigan did reform its
school finance system by largely dispensing with reliance on local property taxes. The ef
fects this reform will have on poor districts, and on Detroit in particular, remain to be seen,
and are being debated by proponents and foes of the reform. See Michael F. Addonizio et
al., Blowing Up the System: Some Fiscal and Legal Perspectives on Michigan's School Fi
nance Reform, 107 EDUC. LAW. REP. 15 (1996).
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resources to minority districts.231 These districts simply do not have a
great deal of political clout in their state legislatures, and it is hard to
imagine that there was a political consensus in favor of benefiting
them. What is true of minority districts in New Jersey, Texas, and
Arizona seems generally true of minority districts elsewhere. It is
therefore difficult to imagine a strong political consensus among state
legislators to redistribute or raise resources for predominantly minor
ity districts.232 Moreover, the public opposition to the QEA in New
Jersey, as well as Tedin's and Reed's studies, suggest that incorporat
ing minority districts within a larger group of beneficiaries that in
cludes white districts may not be sufficient to overcome popular per
ception that legislative reform will primarily assist minorities. Instead,
it appears that this popular perception is shaped and fixed by the in
volvement of minority districts in school finance litigation, which in
turn creates a dynamic that only increases legislative resistance to
school finance reform.

IV. IMPLICATIONS
It seems safe to conclude from the evidence presented here that
minority districts do not fare as well in school finance litigation as do
white districts, and that school finance reform is at times seen through
a racial lens. Race thus appears to be a salient issue in school finance
reform and litigation. This fact is significant for at least three reasons
- one academic, one historical, and one practical.
From a purely academic perspective, the evidence detailed in this
Article offers additional proof that one cannot fully understand the
dynamics and limitations of school finance reform without paying at
tention to the dynamics of race relations in general and school deseg
regation in particular. I suggested as much in an earlier article, and
the evidence here bolsters that suggestion.233 School finance scholars
seeking to make sense of the disparate outcomes in school finance liti
gation, understand the likelihood of legislative recalcitrance, and pre
dict future trends in school finance would do well to consider the ra
cial composition of the school districts challenging state funding
schemes.
231. This dynamic is neatly demonstrated by the New Jersey Legislature's handling of
the QEA, which ultimately devoted only a small portion of the additional state aid to the 28
Abbott districts. See Reed, supra note 3, at 211-12.
232 Cf. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993). Massey and Denton con
tend that residential segregation has also led to political isolation of minority districts. Be
cause these communities are isolated geographically, the argument goes, they have a difficult
time forming coalitions with other groups that might otherwise share common goals. See id.
at 153-62; see also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 605-63 (1944).
233.

See Ryan, supra note 9, at 255.
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As for the historical implications of this evidence, it suggests that
the NAACP's desegregation strategy was a sound one. This strategy
was based on the principle of tying the fate of white and black students
together in order to ensure that white legislators and school officials
could not benefit white students without also benefiting black stu
dents. Put more crudely, the strategy was based on the notion that
green follows white, and that black students would receive more edu
cational resources if placed in white schools.234 As it turned out, many
minority districts were able to secure additional funding, while re
maining racially isolated, through the device of Milliken II funding.
This funding, however, is of course dependent on court order and will
likely disappear when desegregation decrees are dismantled.
The precarious financial position of Milliken II districts stands in
sharp contrast to the relatively stable funding of the few integrated,
metropolitan-wide school districts and their integrated or predomi
nantly white urban counterparts. As for metropolitan-wide school dis
tricts, Charlotte-Mecklenberg in North Carolina, Louisville-Jefferson
County in Kentucky, and Nashville-Davidson County in Tennessee
are three excellent examples of well-integrated school districts that
encompass both central cities and surrounding suburbs.235 Not only do
they spend above their statewide averages, even when adjusted for
relevant costs, but their funding - save for a tiny portion of Char
lotte-Mecklenberg's236 - is not dependent on desegregation decrees.237

234.

See id. at 258-59.

235. Each of the districts is majority white. Charlotte-Mecklenberg is 46% minority;
Louisville-Jefferson County is 33% minority; and Nashville-Davidson County is 45% mi
nority. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 64-65.
236. In 1993-94, Charlotte-Mecklenberg received $3.28 million from the federal gov
ernment to help fund magnet programs. See Telephone Interview with John Dean, District
Staff (June 30, 1998). There were between 87,000 and 93,000 students enrolled in the district
that year, which works out to between $38 and $35 per student. See School District Data
Book, supra note 75, at North Carolina, Mecklenberg (reporting that in 1989-90 the district
enrolled approximately 87,000 students); Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 219 (reporting
that in 1996 Charolotte-Mecklenberg had 93,000 students). This obviously does not explain
the $300 per pupil that Charlotte-Mecklenberg spends above the state average. See Quality
Counts, supra note 21, at 67.
237. Louisville-Jefferson County spent roughly $500 over the state average in 1993-94,
and Nashville-Davidson County spent roughly $550 over the state average. See Quality
Counts, supra note 21, at 66-67. Las Vegas, which is in the Oark County school district, is
another good example of the benefits of a metropolitan district, but also an illustration that
such districts may face pressure from wealthier communities to split apart. See id. at 198-99.
Las Vegas is 37% minority and in 1993-94 spent slightly less ($14 per pupil) than the state
average when cost adjustments were made. See id. at 65, 67. Overall, Nevada has one of the
most equitable financing systems in the country; indeed, a GAO report found that Nevada
was the only state in which every district could make the average per-pupil expenditure with
average tax effort. See SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO REDUCE F'UNDING GAPS
BETWEEN POOR AND WEALTHY DISTRICTS, GAO/HEHS-97-13, at 16 (1997). The fairness
of the school finance scheme in Nevada stems from the district configurations in the state:
there are only 17 districts, all county-wide. That poor areas are helped by such districting is
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What is more; these districts have relatively fewer impoverished stu
dents than typical urban districts and thus do not face the difficulties
caused by concentrated poverty.238
As for urban districts, Salt Lake City, Portland (Oregon), and
Albuquerque are all city-only districts, and all have fairly well
integrated school systems.239 None receives desegregation funding.
Both Salt Lake and Portland spent above their state averages in 199394. Albuquerque spent slightly less, but the city is nonetheless still
seen as the "powerhouse" of the state. The Legislature, moreover, re
cently revamped the school financing policy to provide more funding
to districts with at-risk students, which should benefit Albuquerque.
As proof of Albuquerque's political strength, the Legislature made
these changes to its school finance system despite the fact that a school
finance challenge was unsuccessful in court. New Mexico's finance
scheme is now considered to be one of the most equitable in the coun
try.240
These counter-examples of relatively well-funded, integrated dis
tricts tend to vindicate the NAACP's desegregation strategy. The evi
dence from these districts suggests that "tying" has worked, at least at
the level of school funding. The poorest neighborhoods, and the
poorest students, do appear to benefit from having their fates tied to
the fates of wealthier neighborhoods and students. As others have
noted, in metropolitan districts, "[t]he children of the most powerful
and least powerful sectors of the community depend on the same large
institution, and all races and classes have a vital interest in its sue-

perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that some wealthier communities are attempting to
secede from school districts. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 201.
238. Reports regarding each of the cities credit the merger of city and suburban districts
for the relative good fortune of these school districts. The merger of Louisville with Jeffer
son County, which occurred as a result of one of the rare, successful interdistrict desegrega
tion cases, bolstered "what were at the time bankrupt and troubled downtown schools. If
the Jefferson County and Louisville schools had stayed separate, Kentuckians say, the Lou
isville school system would have the same, seemingly intractable problems found in urban
systems in other states." Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 161. Similarly, the city of Char
lotte's good fortune "is largely credited to its union with Mecklenberg County, with its
wealthy subdivisions and its solid middle-class base." Id. at 220. The merger, according to
those familiar with the system, "has meant equity of funding for urban and suburban schools
alike and improved conditions for the poorest students. The combined system has also
helped prevent the flight of affluent white residents from the urban center." Id.; see also
Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80
MINN. L. REV. 825 (1996). Likewise, the merger of Nashville schools with the surrounding
schools in Davidson County provided Nashville access to the resources of the wealthiest
county in Tennessee. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 245.
239. Salt Lake has a surprising number of minority students - 30% - given that the
entire public school enrollment is only 9% minority. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 65.
Portland is 32% minority, in a state where public school enrollment is 14% minority. See id.
Albuquerque has a majority (55%) of minority students, mostly Hispanic, in a state where
public school enrollment has an even higher percentage of minority students (60% ). See id.
240. See Quality Counts, supra note 21, at 208.
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cess."241 In addition, allocation decisions in states with metropolitan
districts do not pit central cities against suburbs but instead feature a
unified metropolitan area seeking resources with one voice.242 Given
the balance of power in many state legislatures, where suburban leg
islators dominate, this different political dynamic and the coalition be
tween suburb and city seem crucial and undoubtedly explain why the
funding in metropolitan districts seems on surer footing than does the
funding in predominantly minority, urban districts. For the latter, re
liance on the courts, either for desegregation funding or school finance
reform, is often seen as the only alternative. As this Article reveals,
however, such reliance has led to fleeting relief in the desegregation
context and even less in the school finance context.
Finally, from a practical perspective, the evidence presented here
indicates that school finance reform is not a perfect substitute for de
segregation. As mentioned earlier, support for school desegregation
appears to be on the wane among blacks and whites, liberals and con
servatives. More and more, courts, advocates, and academics alike as
sert that desegregation is not the answer, and that poor, urban minor
ity schools will succeed if given more resources to adopt one of several
popular educational reforms.243 The current, conventional wisdom, in
short, is that reform efforts should be directed solely at improving the
education that minority students receive, regardless of whether those
students are in integrated or segregated schools.244

241. Orfield, supra note 238, at 834. See generally James S. Liebman, Desegregating
Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990).
242. See Orfield, supra note 238, at 836.
243. The three reforms that are currently in fashion, and which overlap to a certain ex
tent, are standards-based reform, whole-school or systemic reform, and site-based manage
ment. See, e.g., JEAN ANYON, GHETIO SCHOOLING: A PoLmCAL ECONOMY OF URBAN
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 9-12 (1997) (describing scope of current reforms and history of
earlier waves of reform); ALLAN ODDEN & CAROLYN BUSCH, FINANCING SCHOOLS FOR
HIGH PERFORMANCE:
STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE USE OF EDUCATIONAL
REsOURCES (1998); Olatokunbo S. Fashola & Robert E. Slavin, Schoolwide Reform Models:
What Works?, 19 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 370 (1998) (describing whole-school reform pro
grams); James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the 90s: Political Reconstruction, Liberal
Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 16 VA. L. REV. 349, 371-78
(1990) (describing standards movement); Kenneth K. Wong et al., Prospects: Special Analy
ses, prepared for the U.S. Department of Education (1996). The precursor to today's re
forms was the "effective schools" movement, which sought to identify the most essential
traits - such as effective leadership and strong teacher preparation - of productive and
successful schools. See, e.g., Stewart C. Purkey & Marshall S. Smith, Effective Schools: A
Review, 83 ELEMENTARY. SCH. J. 427 (1983).
244. See, e.g., WELLS & CRAIN, supra note 53, at 336. In their case study of the St. Louis
desegregation plan, which sends thousands of minority students from the city to suburban
schools, Wells and Crain report that "[t]ime and time again educators, policy makers, par
ents, students, and 'people on the streets' of metropolitan St. Louis told us that the millions
of dollars the state pays to bring nearly 13,000 African-American students to suburban
schools would be better spent 'fixing up' the city schools." Id.; see also STEVE FARKAS &
JEAN JOHNSON, TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND WHITE PARENTS SET AN
AGENDA FOR PuBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (1998) (reporting results of survey conducted by Public
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I would like to suggest that it is not as easy as the conventional
wisdom would suggest to separate the racial composition of a school
district and the district's chances of receiving sufficient resources to
support educational reform. I interpret the evidence collected in this
Article as demonstrating that as long as race affects the decisionmak
ing of courts or legislatures, the racial make-up of school districts \vill
continue to affect decisions regarding school funding. This reality has
been absent from the debate about abandoning integration as a goal in
education reform. It deserves to be included and seriously considered,
particularly by those who advocate the creation or maintenance of
single-race schools.245
I have argued elsewhere that it would be unwise as a matter of
education policy to abandon integration, given the demonstrable
benefits of integration and the dearth of evidence indicating that in
creasing expenditures in racially isolated schools is academically effi
cacious.246 This Article poses something of an argument in the alterna
tive, in an effort to demonstrate that it may also be unwise, from a
financial perspective, to abandon integration. In other words, even if
increasing expenditures in urban minority schools would enable them
to provide an education comparable to that provided in the average
suburban district (a scenario I find implausible), we are still left with
the question: What is the likelihood that minority schools will receive
funds sufficient to carry out this task? Based on the evidence dis
cussed above, the answer is not encouraging: many minority districts
are going to lose their Milliken II funding in the near future, and the
prospects of using school finance litigation to maintain or increase cur
rent expenditure levels appears dim.
CONCLUSION
Given the past difficulties with and current opposition to manda
tory school desegregation, it is perhaps not surprising that integration
is rarely mentioned these days by academics, school officials, or legis
lators as a worthwhile goal in education reform. Indeed, even the re
cent Presidential Commission on Race explicitly recognized the value
of a racially diverse student body but, remarkably, failed to include in-

Agenda and the Public Education Network, which indicated that African-American parents,
by an 80% to 9% margin, "say the higher priority for the nation's schools should be to raise
academic standards and achievement rather than focus on achieving more diversity and inte
gration").
245. See generally

DERRICK BELL, JR., AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE
JUSTICE (1987); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION
(Derrick A. Bell, ed. 1980); Alex Johnson Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice:
Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1401 (1993).
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246. See Ryan, supra note 9, at 286-304.
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creasing integration as an explicit goal for the future.247 In light of the
current political mood, it is also understandable that those sincerely
interested in improving the educational opportunities of poor minority
students would look to alternative reforms, which do not strive to in
crease racial or socioeconomic integration.
I suggest that the evidence presented in this Article should be
something of an alarm bell to those pursuing these alternative paths,
and that it should prod advocates and academics to reconsider, if not
redouble, efforts to increase integration. Not only does integration
carry with it educational benefits that school finance reform fails to
provide, 248 it also appears to carry with it financial benefits and finan
cial stability that school finance litigation has been unable to deliver to
predominantly minority districts. Support for this assertion, again, is
found in contrasting the financial instability of Milliken II districts
with the relatively ample and stable funding of integrated city and
metropolitan districts. Thus, even if one believes that minority stu
dents need money rather than more integration in order to improve
their achievement, integration - unlike school finance litigation - is
a demonstrably effective means of securing resources for poor minor
ity students. Continued or increased racial isolation, by contrast,
seems an especially poor financial strategy.
This is not to suggest that the public can be persuaded suddenly to
accept busing and mandatory integration among urban and suburban
schools. Rather, it is to suggest that, at the very least, the goal of inte
gration must be decoupled from prior unsuccessful efforts to desegre
gate schools. For too long, integration and mandatory busing have
been inextricably linked, such that public displeasure with the latter
has tainted the perception of the former. The goal of integration,
however, is quite distinct from the means of achieving it. Even if the
traditional means of achieving integration must be abandoned, it does
not follow that the goal itself must be abandoned. On the contrary,
this Article suggests that our search should be for alternative methods
to increase integration, not for an alternative goal.249

247. See THE ADVISORY BOARD TO TIIE PREsIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S IN!TIATIVE ON
RACE, ONE AMERICA IN TIIE 21ST CENTURY (Sept. 1998).
248.

See Ryan, supra note 9, at 301-07.

249. For suggestions on two possible strategies for increasing racial and socioeconomic
integration, see Ryan, supra note 9, at 307-15, and James E. Ryan, She� Segregation, and
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999).

